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INTRODUCTION 
The system of European administration is undergoing a 
fundamental transformation as a result of the European Union’s 
eastern enlargement, ever-growing political tasks, and the challenges 
of economic globalization.1 Traditionally, most administrative tasks 
were either fulfilled directly on the federal level by the European 
Commission, or by national authorities acting according to the 
principle of “indirect administration.”2 By the end of the 1980s only 
two agencies existed.3 It was only in recent years that an ever 
increasing number of administrative agencies appeared on the 
European scale. Many more agencies were founded since 1990, and 
cover a broad range of policies including environmental law, health 
care, railway & aviation safety and anti-terrorism issues.4 The 
headquarters of these agencies are located all over Europe in cities 
 1. See EU Welcomes Romania and Bulgaria, BBC NEWS, Jan. 1, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6222673.stm (reporting that the entry of 
Romania and Bulgaria on January 1, 2007 brought the total number of the 
European Union members to twenty-seven, and the total population to half a 
billion citizens). 
 2. See Renaud Dehousse, Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of 
European Governance, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED MARKET 
207, 221 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds., 2002) (observing that the 
implementation powers transferred to newly created agencies were usually taken 
away from national administrations). 
 3. See PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 148-50 (2006) (detailing the 
history of the creation of E.U. agencies). 
 4. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council: European Agencies – The Way Forward, at 4, COM (2008) 135 final 
(Mar. 11, 2008) [hereinafter The Way Forward] (explaining that the growth in 
regulatory agencies in the 1990s resulted from “the deepening of the internal 
market,” which required more union-wide regulation). 
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such as Thessaloniki (Greece), Warsaw (Poland), Lisbon (Portugal) 
and Copenhagen (Denmark). The accountability of the new 
regulatory structure on the European scale is often called into 
question with regard to the availability of judicial review, and 
political and financial controls.5 These questions arise both because 
of the mere novelty of the agency concept and the lack of textual 
roots in the constitutional framework6 of the European Union Treaty 
(TEU) and the European Community Treaty (TEC).7 Other than 
more traditional European institutions—such as the Council of 
Ministers, the Commission and the European Parliament—the E.U. 
agencies emerged completely outside the Treaty framework. 
Moreover, the lack of a constitutional framework causes a broad 
diversification of accountability patterns of E.U. agencies.8 In 
addition, the agency-centered American model of the regulatory and 
administrative state visibly inspired the setting up of E.U. agencies, 
but the concept of independent administrative agencies developed 
very differently in the European context.9 As such, one of the most 
 5. See id. at 5 (discussing the growth in number of E.U. agencies and the 
resulting issue of “the need for clear lines of accountability to govern agencies’ 
actions”). 
 6. See, e.g., Case 294/83, Parti ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. Parliament, 1986 
E.C.R. 1339, ¶ 23 (referring to the European treaties as the Community’s 
“constitutional charter”). 
 7. See DEIDRE CURTIN, MIND THE GAP: THE EVOLVING EU EXECUTIVE AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 7 (Wouter Devroe & Dimitri Droshout eds., 2004) (noting the 
lack of “constitutionalization” of administrative agencies in the Treaty Establishing 
a Constitution for Europe); ANTHONY ARNULL ET AL., WYATT & DASHWOOD’S 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW 10-11 (5th ed. 2006) (listing institutions established by the 
two founding treaties). 
 8. See Martin Shapiro, Two Transformations in Administrative Law: 
American and European?, in THE EUROPEANISATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 
TRANSFORMING NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES 14, 20-21 (Karl-
Heinz Ladeur ed., 2002) (showing how the lack of unified administration of EU 
regulations results in inconsistencies when the regulations are implemented by 
national authorities). 
 9. See id. at 21 (discussing the American influence on E.U. administrative law 
in pushing E.U. courts towards transparency and participation, but in a less radical 
form); Mark Thatcher, The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and 
Elected Politicians in Europe, 18 GOVERNANCE 347, 347-49 (2007) (using 
principal-agent theories, largely developed in the United States, to analyze 
European agencies); Mark A. Pollack, Learning from the Americanists (Again): 
Theory and Method in the Study of Delegation, 25 W. EUR. POL. 200, 200 (2002) 
(asserting that European scholars have largely modeled their theories about 
delegation of powers to non-majoritarian institutions on American theories). 
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distinctive features within a broad and diverse set of mechanisms is 
the integration of European national authorities into the federal 
administrative sphere. 
Part I of this Article addresses the developing institutional 
framework of the E.U. administrative sphere, especially the 
emergence and structural effects of agency-administration. Part II 
examines the diversity and unity of various accountability 
mechanisms in detail by exploring into the institutional design of two 
particular agencies—the European Medicines Agency, and the 
European Aviation Safety Agency. Next, Part III draws on future 
prospects such as the potential constitutionalization of E.U. agencies 
through the 2007 E.U. Treaty of Lisbon and the emergence of global 
licensing cooperation. 
I. EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATION THROUGH 
AGENCIES 
Today’s system of integrated network administration through E.U. 
agencies developed gradually. With the broad establishment of 
agencies, the E.U. departed little by little from the institutional 
paradigms of direct administration on the European and indirect 
administration on the national level, which had governed European 
integration since the 1950s. 
A. THE TRADITIONAL MODES OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT 
ADMINISTRATION 
The traditional model, which prevailed between the 1950s and 
1980s, applied two modes of European administration. In particular, 
the model provides for direct administration through the 
Commission, and indirect administration through the Member 
States.10 Direct administration through the European Commission is 
clearly the less frequent administrative mode, which is applied, for 
example, in the area of competition law and state subsidies, e.g., 
 10. See Sabino Cassese, European Administrative Proceedings, 68 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 21 (2004) (discussing the initial model where only 
competition law and state subsidies were administered by the European 
Community, while Member States implemented the remaining regulations). 
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agricultural subsidies.11 The European institutional architecture is 
notorious for its idiosyncrasy and complexity. The central European 
institutions are (1) the E.U. Council—which is comprised of one 
minister of each Member State, (2) the European Commission, 
 (3) the European Parliament and (4) the European Court of Justice. 
The legislative power is primarily vested within the Council. The 
European Parliament has to approve the legislation, of which the two 
main types are regulations and directives. The Commission does not 
only issue proposals for E.U. legislation, but is also the institution 
with the strongest administrative features.12 Member states entrusted 
the Commission with adjudicatory functions from the very beginning 
of European integration in the 1950s.13 From then onward the 
Commission also exercised rule-making powers delegated from the 
Council. Thus the E.U. Council and the European Commission do 
not only operate in a policy relation (“the Commission proposes, the 
Council disposes”), but also in a delegation relation.14 The European 
Court of Justice acknowledged the necessity of delegated legislation 
 11. See Francesca Bignami, Foreword: The Administrative Law of the 
European Union, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3-4 (2004) (discussing the effect of 
the European Commission’s early use of committees of national regulators to make 
constant adjustments of quotas and pricing for agricultural subsidies on the 
development of European administrative law); CRAIG, supra note 3, at 31-33 
(examining the reasons for the Commission’s recent trend to undertake 
administration more directly, without a systematic relationship with national 
bureaucracies). 
 12. See generally George A. Bermann, Executive Power in the New European 
Constitution, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 440 (2005) (distinguishing administrative and 
executive authority of the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European 
Council and noting that the Commission’s mission is most “executive-branch-
sounding”). 
 13. See European Commission, The European Commission at Work, Basic 
Facts, http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/basicfacts/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 
2008) (stating the “European Commission was created to represent the European 
interest common to all Member States of the Union” and explaining the 
Commission’s role as “guardian of the Treaties and defender of the general 
interest”). 
 14. See Case C-240/90, F.R.G. v. Comm’n, 1992 E.C.R. I-5383, ¶ 41 (holding 
that the Council may delegate implementation of its regulations to the Commission 
without providing detailed instructions on the implementation); Anand Menon & 
Stephen Weatherill, Legitimacy, Accountability, and Delegation in the European 
Union, in ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 113, 120 
(Anthony Arnull & Daniel Wincott eds., 2002) (focusing on the relationship 
between delegation and legitimacy in the legislative framework). 
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early on, in the 1958 Meroni case, however also set relatively strict 
limits for such delegations.15
In Meroni, the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) had created a special obligatory system to 
regulate the ferrous scrap market. This equalization system was to be 
administered by Brussels based agencies “under the responsibility of 
the High Authority.”16 The case came to the ECJ after the Italian 
Steel Company Meroni refused to pay a fee to the Imported Ferrous 
Scrap Equalization Fund.17 The ECJ acknowledged the general 
possibility of transferring power, but simultaneously limited the 
discretion of the E.U. legislature to delegate that power. The Court 
stated first that a delegating authority “could not confer upon the 
authority receiving the delegation powers different from those which 
the delegating authority itself received under the Treaty”18 and 
second that it is not possible to delegate power involving a wide 
margin of discretion.19 The “execution of actual economic policy” 
should be unlawful, since the latter “replaces the choices of the 
delegator by the choices of the delegate” and “brings about an actual 
transfer of responsibility.”20
More than fifty years after its establishment, the Meroni doctrine 
is called into question by the partially extensive practice of 
delegation to both the Commission and further European institutions, 
such as the European Central Bank,21 and the regulatory agencies.22 
 15. Case 10/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA, v. High Auth. of 
the European Coal & Steel Cmty., 1958 E.C.R. 53. 
 16. Id. at 169. 
 17. See id. at 160 (observing that the Italian company filed for an annulment of 
the High Authority’s demand of payment to the Imported Ferrous Scrap 
Equalization Fund). 
 18. Id. at 171. 
 19. See id. at 173 (reasoning that delegating wide discretionary powers to 
bodies that were not established by the Treaty is to subvert the Treaty’s guarantee 
of the balance of powers). 
 20. Id. at 173. 
 21. See Rosa Maria Lastra, The Division of Responsibilities Between the 
European Central Bank and the National Central Bank Within the European 
System of Central Banks, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 167, 167, 180 (2000) (arguing that 
the responsibilities of the European Central Bank and the national central banks 
“have not been clearly transferred from the national to the supranational arena” and 
“the language of the treaties allows for various interpretations” of the autonomy of 
the European Central Bank). But see Roger J. Goebel, Court of Justice Oversight 
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In particular, the emergence of a system of increasingly powerful 
E.U. agencies challenges the basic idea of Meroni, which requires 
justification for every administrative action implying policy 
choices.23 However, the European Court of Justice apparently still 
considers the Meroni doctrine good law. In 2005, the ECJ explicitly 
referred to Meroni in a case concerning the delegation of 
implementing powers from the Council to the Commission, noting 
that “when the Community legislature wishes to delegate its power to 
amend aspects of the legislative act at issue, it must ensure that that 
power is clearly defined and that the exercise of the power is subject 
to strict review in the light of objective criteria.”24 Similarly, the ECJ 
stressed the ongoing importance of Meroni in another 2005 case 
concerning rules on staff management issued by the European 
Central Bank.25 The European Commission also adheres to the 
Over the European Central Bank, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 610, 628-32 (2006) 
(discussing the Commission v. European Central Bank, Case C-11/00, 2003 E.C.R. 
I-7147, opinion by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in which the court 
upheld the Commission’s power to delegate its antifraud powers to an agency and 
grant it independence even from the Commission itself). 
 22. See Edoardo Chiti, Beyond Meroni: The Community Legitimacy of the 
Provisions Establishing the European Agencies, in EUROPEAN REGULATORY 
AGENCIES 75, 80 (Giacinto Della Cananea ed., 2004) (asserting that “the setting up 
of Community bodies provided with legal personality does not seem to imply a 
hypothesis of delegation of powers by the Commission to an outside body in the 
same sense as in the Meroni jurisprudence”). 
 23. See Herwig C.H. Hofmann & Alexander H. Türk, Policy Implementation, 
in EU ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE 74, 86 (Herwig C.H. Hofmann & Alexander 
H. Türk eds., 2006); see also Stefan Griller & Andreas Orator, Meroni Revisited – 
Empowering European Agencies Between Efficiency and Legitimacy 1, 6 (New 
Gov: New Modes of Governance Project, Reference No. 04/D40, 2007), www.eu-
newgov.org/database/DELIV/D04D40_WP_Meroni_Revisited.pdf (assessing the 
continuing validity of the Meroni doctrine despite later case law that “clearly 
shows that these constraints to the transposability do not exist”). 
 24. See Joined Cases C-154/04 & C-155/04, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for 
Health, 2005 E.C.R. I-6451, ¶ 90 (explaining that delegation standards should be 
relied on to prevent the EU Council from conferring on the delegate “a discretion 
which, in the case of legislation concerning the functioning of the internal market 
in goods, would be capable of impeding, excessively and without transparency, the 
free movement of the goods in question”). 
 25. See Case C-301/02, Tralli v. European Cent. Bank, 2005 ECR I-4071,  
¶¶ 41-46 (finding the European Central Bank’s delegation of power in conformity 
with the Meroni principles); see also Deirdre Curtin, Holding (Quasi-) 
Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account, 13 EUR. L.J. 523, 528 
(2007) (synthesizing the 2005 ECJ case Tralli as allowing delegations of power 
that confer authority to make technical decisions without broad economic or 
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Meroni doctrine, declaring that under current E.U. law, “there are 
clear and strict limits to the autonomous power of regulatory 
agencies.”26
Interestingly the Commission has remained a scarcely staffed body 
with currently about 25,000 employees.27 This is a remarkably small 
figure compared to the U.S. federal government, which currently 
employs 1.8 Million civilians.28 Against the backdrop of twenty-
seven E.U. Member States, nearly 500 Million E.U. citizens, twenty-
three official languages and ever-increasing political tasks, the 
puzzling question is how European administration works with so few 
administrators. The classical answer was the concept of “indirect 
administration.” The national authorities acted simultaneously as 
agents for both domestic and European policy implementation.29 It 
was only over time that more and more tasks were directly assigned 
to actors on the federal European level—and particularly actors 
beyond the Commission. As the European integration became ever 
closer,30 the scope of tasks to be fulfilled on the E.U. level enlarged 
tremendously, both in terms of regulation and adjudication.31 The 
national administrations were increasingly overarched by European 
political consequences). 
 26. See The Way Forward, supra note 4, at 5 (stating further that “[a]gencies 
cannot be given the power to adopt general regulatory measures. They are limited 
to taking individual decisions . . . without genuine discretionary power”). 
 27. See European Commission, Civil Service, Staff Figures, http://ec.europa. 
eu/civil_service/about/figures/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2008) (reporting 
the total number of Commission staff at about 24,500 officials and temporary 
agents, with approximately an additional 9,500 external staff members). But see 
Rob Watts, Found: the EU’s 20,000 Employees Hiding in Brussels, THE SUNDAY 
TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 28, 2007, at 15 (suggesting that the count for European 
Commission employees is actually higher than the 25,000 staff it claims on its 
website). 
 28. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR AND STATISTICS, CAREER 
GUIDE TO INDUSTRIES, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, EXCLUDING THE POSTAL SERVICE 
(2008-09 ed.), http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs041.htm. 
 29. See Cassese, supra note 10, at 21 (citing the “allocation of European social 
and agricultural funds” as an example where national administrations were in 
charge of implementing Community policies). 
 30. See ARNULL ET AL., supra note 7, at 16-18 (emphasizing the importance of 
the European Single Act of 1986 and the Treaty on the European Union  in 
strengthening the economic and political cooperation among member states). 
 31. See id. at 113 (pointing out the tremendous growth in the European 
Community’s competencies in the scope of activities). 
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structures.32 One issue was contracting out to private parties, which 
began to play a larger role in the 1980s and 1990s. Contracts were 
used to guarantee for the delivery of many of the programs directly 
administered by the Commission, for example in the context of 
promotion for tourism in the European Community, of decentralized 
cooperation with non-member countries of the southern 
Mediterranean, and of the European Community Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO).33 However, in the late 1990s, these contracting 
procedures were heavily criticized for their lack of transparency and 
financial opaqueness.34 There were several critical investigations by 
a Committee of Independent Experts,35 and also by the European 
Court of Auditors,36 which finally resulted in the resignation of 
European Commission President Jacques Santer.37
Another important development was the emergence of the so-
called Comitology system38 that incorporated the rule-making 
 32. See Herwig C. H. Hofmann & Alexander Türk, The Department of 
Integrated Administration in the EU and its Consequences, 13 EUR. L.J. 253, 254 
(2007) (illustrating how the traditional distinction between administrative roles of 
Member States and E.U. actors “has become increasingly blurred” and has resulted 
in Europe’s “integrated administration”); Cassese, supra note 10, at 35 (remarking 
on the hierarchical superiority of the European supranational institutions over 
national ones). 
 33. See CRAIG, supra note 3, at 6-7, 52-53 (detailing the Commission’s 
contracting practices and some resultant problems). 
 34. See id. at 3-4 (discussing the long-running concern about allegations of 
fraud and mismanagement in the European Community’s contracting practices). 
 35. See Committee of Independent Experts First Report on Allegations 
Regarding Fraud, Mismanagement, and Nepotism in the European Commission 
137-39 (Mar. 1999), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/experts/ 
report1_en.htm (examining cases of fraud, mismanagement, and nepotism in the 
Tourism Unit, MED programme, ECHO, Technical Assistance Office, Security 
Office, and Nuclear Safety). 
 36. See Court of Auditors Special Report No 16/2000 on Tendering Procedures 
for Service Contracts Under the Phare and Tacis Programmes, Together with the 
Commission’s Replies, 2000 O.J. (C 350) 1, 3 (noting that the Auditors conducted 
an investigation of certain programs in response to a request made by the person in 
charge of closing out financial year 1997). 
 37. See CRAIG, supra note 3, at 52 (attributing the demise of the Santer 
Commission to revelations about fraud surrounding Commission contracts). 
 38. See Guenther A. Schaefer & Alexander Türk, The Role of Implementing 
Committees, in THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES IN THE POLICY-PROCESS OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 182, 182-83 (Thomas Christiansen & Torbjörn Larsson eds., 
2007) (providing an overview of factors leading up to the development of the 
comitology system in which the Commission must consult committees composed 
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powers of the European Commission gradually into a system 
currently encompassing between 200 and 300 different committees 
of various competences.39 From the 1960s on, ever more Committees 
emerged, which were comprised of Member State nominees, and 
chaired by a Commission official.40 Before adopting an 
implementing rule, the Commission has to present a draft for 
evaluation and comment to the specific committee, sometimes even 
requiring the committee’s approval.41 The Comitology system was 
conceived of very differently in the academia and in the general 
public. Although some scholars were very sympathetic, and stressed 
the deliberative and democratic potential,42 the majority of scholars 
and the general public were suspicious of the informality and lack of 
transparency in the system.43 Over time the Comitology regime was 
of representatives of the Member States before implementing legislation that was 
delegated to it by the Council). 
 39. See Report from the Commission on the Working of Committees During 
2005, 10, COM (2006) 466 final (Sept. 8, 2006) (reporting that there were 250 
comitology committees in 2005). 
 40. See Jens Blom-Hensen, The Origins of the EU Comitology System: A Case 
of Informal Agenda-Setting by the Commission, 15 EUR. PUB. POL’Y 208, 209 
(2008) (arguing that the development of the comitology system began in the early 
1960s as a way to address issues in regulating agriculture among the Member 
States). See also Ellen Vos, EU Committees: The Evolution of Unforeseen 
Institutional Actors in European Product Regulation, in EU COMMUNITIES: SOCIAL 
REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS 19, 24 (Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos eds., 
1999) (explaining that advisory and management committees are composed of 
“representatives of Member States and chaired by a representative of the 
Commission”). 
 41. See Vos, supra note 40, at 20-21 (observing the Council’s practice of 
creating two types of committees: those whose approval was required in order for 
the Commission’s decisions to become effective and those whose function was 
purely advisory). 
 42. See Oliver Gerstenberg & Charles F. Sabel, Directly-Deliberative 
Polyarchy: An Institutional Ideal for Europe?, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN 
EUROPE’S INTEGRATED MARKET 289, 295 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse 
eds., 2002) (characterizing comitology as “deliberative supranationalism,” in 
which a group of independent experts make carefully weighted decisions that 
benefit the entire European Community); Christian Joerges & Jurgen Neyer, 
Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-Solving: European 
Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 609, 620-21 (1997) 
(arguing that the comitology system has promoted a “ culture of inter-
administrative partnership which relies on persuasion, argument and discursive 
processes”). 
 43. See Renaud Dehousse, Comitology: Who Watches the Watchmen?, 10 J. 
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 798, 803 (2003) (suggesting a possibility of resentment toward 
  
2009] SUPRANATIONAL ADMINISTRATION 439 
 
partially unified and institutionalized. The First Comitology Decision 
of the Council of 1987 included a reduction of the basic committee 
procedures (reducing to three: advisory, management, and 
regulatory) and also provided for safeguard committee procedures.44 
The Second Comitology Decision of 1999 granted public access to a 
certain extent, and also involved the European Parliament more 
intensively into the rulemaking process.45 In the 2000s, there have 
again been several attempts for further enhancement of transparency 
and participation features.46
B. EMERGENCE AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF E.U. AGENCIES 
From the preceding section it has become clear that the classical 
administrative pattern of administrative organization—characterized 
by (few) administrative tasks carried out directly on the European 
level by the Commission, and the bulk of tasks according to the 
paradigm of “indirect organization” carried out by the Member 
States—had reached its capacity limits when the E.U. took on an 
ever-increasing number of new political tasks.47 Quantitatively, the 
number of E.U. agencies rose rapidly from two entities before 1990 
to now approximately twenty-five. Qualitatively, the E.U. agencies 
committees of experts meeting behind closed doors to decide matters of public 
interest). See also Joseph Weiler, Prologue: Amsterdam and the Quest for 
Constitutional Democracy, in LEGAL ISSUES OF AMSTERDAM TREATY 1, 12 (David 
O’Keeffe & Patrick Twomey eds., 1999) (asserting that “the reality of 
‘comitology’ displays a beast which is quite different from the formal description” 
because its rules of informality in the decision making processes do not reflect 
national interests, but instead perpetuate “functional deliberation and sectoral 
pressure”). 
 44. See Council Decision 87/373, 1987 O.J. (L 197) 33 (EC); see also CRAIG, 
supra note 3, at 106-07 (characterizing the reduction of committee procedures to 
three functions as “an improvement on the status quo ante”). 
 45. Council Decision 468, 1999 O.J. (L 184) 23, 23-24 (EC). 
 46. See Schaefer & Türk, supra note 38, at 185 (discussing the 2006 Council 
Decision that gives both the Council and the European Parliament “extensive 
rights of control over implementing acts which affect both institutions as co-
legislators); CRAIG, supra note 3, at 111-12 (noting that in 2002, the Commission 
proposed to amend the Council’s Second Comitology Decision). 
 47. See R. Daniel Kelemen, The Politics of Eurocracy: Building a New 
European State?, in 7 THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 173, 181, 185 (Nicolas 
Jabko & Craig Parsons eds., 2005) (reporting that the 1990s wave of agency 
creation was prompted by functional pressures on the Commission resulting from 
the single market initiative and noting that such pressures continue to grow). 
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became increasingly powerful by taking on advisory tasks of a 
formal nature, with tremendous de facto influence in the 1990s, and 
formal licensing powers in the 2000s. 
1. A Generation Model of E.U. Agencies 
Today’s system of integrated network administration, including 
E.U. agencies, came only gradually into existence. It was not until 
1975 that a first, rather reluctant, step towards the establishment of 
agencies on the European level was taken. In that year, the European 
Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) and 
the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions (Eurofound) were established.48 These 
institutions were intended to fulfill communication and social 
dialogue tasks.49 At the time of their founding, the involved parties 
were aware of the limited institutional strength and importance of 
Cedefop and Eurofound, and they were not intended to be part of a 
larger process of institutionalization. For this reason, these first 
agencies could only be retrospectively referred to as “first generation 
agencies.” Interestingly, in the 1980s many new agencies were 
established at European national levels,  in various , particularly in 
the area of market competition regulation, including general 
competition authorities, and utility and financial regulators.50
In the early 1990s the E.U. established a second generation of 
agencies. This time the institutional design followed the idea of 
creating distinctive entities at the European level, particularly to 
unburden the existing European administration.51 Yet the influence 
of the Meroni doctrine and its opposition towards discretionary 
European administrative bodies was still very strong.52 Thus, the 
 48. Council Regulation 337/75, art. 1, 1975 O.J. (L 39) 1 (EC); Council 
Regulation 1365/75, art. 1, 1975 O.J. (L 139) 1 (EC). 
 49. Hofmann & Türk, supra note 23, at 86. 
 50. See Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, 29 
W. EUR. POL. 77, 83-84 (1994) (listing agencies created in France and Great 
Britain in the 1970s-1980s and noting that all other European countries 
experienced similar developments). 
 51. See CRAIG, supra note 3, at 146 (noting that the agencies would allow the 
Commission to concentrate on its “core function of policy formulation, with the 
agencies implementing this policy in specific technical areas”). 
 52. See Dehousse, supra note 2, at 218-20 (attributing the Commission’s 
reluctance to delegate to two factors: the Meroni doctrine and the fear of creating 
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agencies remained focused on advisory tasks and preliminary work 
for Commission and Council, which issued all formal decisions.53 
For example, the admission of a new pharmaceutical to the market is 
only prepared by the European Medicines Agency, but is always 
formally adopted by the Commission.54 The agencies created in the 
1990s were given tasks of technical or scientific natures, and charged 
with completing the internal market. Equally new was the 
decentralizing effect that came along with the European Council’s 
decision to disseminate the agency headquarters throughout 
Europe.55 Contextually, in the late 1980s and early 1990s various 
circumstances caused the Member States to support further European 
integration and a new step of institutionalization. There are three 
major aspects to this. First, with the European Single Act of 1986, 
European integration had taken one of its historically most important 
steps. The European Single Act opened up several new political 
tasks, especially in fulfilling the European Common Market.56 
Second, there was growing unwillingness among Member States to 
hand over power to the Commission, which might have caused the 
Commission to favor “independent” agencies and transnational 
regulatory networks.57 Third, the model of U.S. independent agencies 
was closely studied,58 and increasingly found supporters among E.U. 
rival institutions that will encroach on the Commission’s power). 
 53. See id. at 219 (commenting on the history of interpreting agencies’ powers 
narrowly). 
 54. See infra Part II.A.1 (detailing a case study into the accountability features 
of the European Medicines Agency (EMEA)). 
 55. See Council Directive 323/1, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (C 323) 1 (listing locations 
for new agencies); Ellen Vos, Agencies and the European Union, in AGENCIES IN 
EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 113, 126 (Tom Zwart & Luc Verhey 
eds., 2003) (detailing the debates surrounding locations of the second-generation 
agencies). 
 56. See Peter Holmes, Non-Tariff Barriers, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE SINGLE 
EUROPEAN ACT 27, 29-30 (George McKenzie & Anthony J. Venables eds., 1991) 
(observing that, in addition to setting a deadline for the creation of an internal 
market, the Single European Act granted the Council of Ministers powers to 
harmonize national laws). 
 57. See Dehousse, supra note 2, at 217 (commenting on the growing gap 
between the ever-increasing need for the regulation of risk on the E.U. level and 
the relatively constant number of the Commission staff over the years). 
 58. JOACHIM SPALCKE, ARZNEIMITTELZULASSUNGSVERFAHREN IN DER 
EUROPÄISCHEN UNION UND DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA: 
ENTWICKLUNG UND HARMONISIERUNG (2004). 
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law makers.59 The legal basis for this wave of agency founding was 
the then-Article 235 (now Article 308) of the Treaty of the European 
Community.60 In 1990, the European Environment Agency (EEA) 
successfully launched, mostly as an information-managing 
institution.61 A number of further agencies immediately followed, 
including the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA, 1993), the Office for Harmonization in the 
Internal Market (OHIM, 1993), the European Agency for Health and 
Safety at Work (EU-OSHA, 1994) and the Community Plant Variety 
Office (CPVO, 1994).62 One of the most significant new agencies of 
this area was the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal 
Products (EMEA, 1993).63 To ensure the support of the Member 
States, the E.U. arranged the new agencies as part of a “hub and 
spoke network,” which guaranteed an ongoing role for the Member 
States.64 This idea of cooperation (also realized in the management 
boards comprised of Member State representatives) actually made 
the agencies, from the national perspective, appear much less as an 
 59. See Xenophon A. Yataganas, Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the 
European Union: The Relevance of the American Model of Independent Agencies 
23-27 (The Jean Monnet Program, Working Paper 3/01, 2001), 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010301.html (explaining the 
expansion of U.S. style independent regulatory authority as a response to social 
and economic changes in the E.U.); Giandomenico Majone, From the Positive to 
the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequence of Changes in the Mode of 
Governance, 17 J. PUB. POL’Y 139, 152-56 (1997) (comparing the rise of the 
European regulatory state to the U.S. system of agencies and judicial review). 
 60. See CRAIG, supra note 3, at 150 (noting that Article 308 is now used only 
for agencies tasked with implementing policy based on that Article). 
 61. Council Regulation 1210/90, art. 1, 1990 O.J. (L 120) (EC). 
 62. See Yataganas, supra note 59, at n.107 (listing dates of establishment of 
European agencies). 
 63. See European Medicines Agency, About EMEA – Structure, http://www. 
emea.europa.eu/htms/aboutus/emeaoverview.htm (summarizing EMEA’s mission 
as “protection and promotion of public and animal health” by conducting scientific 
evaluations of applications for marketing of new medicines). 
 64. See Kelemen, supra note 47, at 181 (noting that the network model, in 
which “the European agencies would serve as hubs of regulatory networks with the 
national authorities their spokes,” helped alleviate tensions between supranational 
and national authorities). See also Pierre Larouche, Coordination of European and 
Member State Regulatory Policy: Horizontal, Vertical and Transversal Aspects, in 
REGULATION THROUGH AGENCIES IN THE EU: A NEW PARADIGM OF EUROPEAN 
GOVERNANCE 164 (Damien Geradin et al. eds., 2005) (using competition law as an 
example of vertical, horizontal, and transversal coordination systems between and 
among European regulatory agencies and member states). 
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evil, particularly since there were similarities to the received 
Comitology system. 
The institutional design of the third agency generation in the 2000s 
was even stronger.  The new agencies included the European 
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA, 2004), the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC, 2004), 
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA, 2002), the European 
Railway Agency (ERA, 2004) and the Community Fishery Control 
Agency (CFCA, 2005).65 Among the new entities were the first E.U. 
agencies with formal licensing power and competences to investigate 
the enforcement of national laws. In particular, these entities are the 
European Aviation Safety Agency, which is issuing type-certificates 
for aircrafts,66 and the European Chemicals Agency, that the E.U. 
designed to ensure the technical, scientific and administrative 
progress of the chemical regulation regime established by the 2006 
REACH regulation.67 With this qualitative extension of powers, the 
legal constraints of the Meroni doctrine seemingly declined.68 
According to a recent statement of the European Commission, the 
agencies established under the EC treaty altogether “employ some 
3,800 staff, with an annual budget of around 1,100 million Euro, 
including a Community contribution of around 559 million.”69
 65. See generally Parliament & Council Regulation 460/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 77) 
1 (EC) (creating the European Network and Information Security Agency); 
Parliament & Council Regulation 851/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 1 (EC) (creating the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control); Parliament & Council 
Regulation 1592/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 240) 1 (EC) (repealed Apr. 8, 2008) (creating 
the European Aviation and Safety Agency); Parliament & Council Regulation 
881/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 164) 1 (EC) (creating the European Railway Agency); 
Council Regulation 768/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 128) 1 (EC) (creating the Community 
Fishery Control Agency). 
 66. Parliament & Council Regulation 216/2008, arts. 18-21, 2008 O.J. (L 79) 1, 
14-16 (EC). See infra Part III.A.2 (assessing the agency in detail). 
 67. Parliament & Council Regulation 1907/2006, ¶¶ 15, 19, 20, 24, 29, 33, 
2006 O.J. (L 396) 1 (EU) (requiring manufacturers of chemicals to submit reports 
to the European Chemicals Agency and empowering the agency to require 
registration of certain substances). 
 68. See Griller & Orator, supra note 23, at 6-11 (presenting arguments for 
overruling Meroni as burdensome and inefficient and showing that the ECJ, the 
Commission, and many commentators all support its continued application). 
 69. The Way Forward, supra note 4, at 4. 
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2. The Rationale for E.U. Agencies in the 2000s: Eastern 
Enlargement, New Governance, Institutional Credibility 
The latest and probably most significant wave of agency 
establishment occurred for three major reasons. First, the enormous 
dimensions of the next round of E.U. enlargement became visible. It 
turned out that by 2004 the European Union would have expanded 
from fifteen to twenty-five Member States, adding to the Union such 
states as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.70 Even further 
enlargement came in sight, potentially extending the E.U. to include 
Bulgaria and Romania (realized in 2007), Turkey, and the successor 
states of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia joined the E.U. in 2004).71 
With the significantly increased workload and variety of new tasks 
resulting from the enlargement, there was an obvious need for the 
creation of new European administrative bodies, particularly to 
unburden the European Commission. The agency model was 
proposed as a work relief for the existing E.U. institutions.72 Relying 
on agencies to implement policies in specific technical areas would 
allow the Commission to focus on the function of forming the 
policies. With regard to the composition of the agencies, the 
Commission favored supranational regulators over nationally 
controlled bodies.73
 70. Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Challenges of Adjustment: Economic Integration in 
a Wider Europe, in ADJUSTING TO EU ENLARGEMENT: RECURRING ISSUES IN A 
NEW SETTING 151, 151 (Constantine A. Stephanou ed., 2006) (remarking on the 
dramatic changes of the geopolitical and economic framework in Europe with the 
entry of the Eastern European states into the EU). 
 71. See generally ADJUSTING TO EU ENLARGEMENT: RECURRING ISSUES IN A 
NEW SETTING, supra note 70 (providing an overview of institutional consequences 
of the eastern enlargement). 
 72. See Budget Directorate General Evaluation Unit, Meta-Evaluation on the 
Community Agency System 28-31 (Sept. 2003), http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/ 
documents/evaluation/eval_review/meta_eval_agencies_en.pdf [hereinafter Meta-
Evaluation on the Community Agency System] (exploring the impact of the 
“rationale of outsourcing” on the efficiency and effectiveness of existing agencies 
by discussing previously unmet needs and potential value added); 
ÉLARGISSEMENT: COMMENT L’EUROPE S’ADAPTE (Renaud Dehousse et al. eds., 
2006). 
 73. See Meta-Evaluation on the Community Agency System, supra note 72, at 
6-7 (enhancing the role and representation of the Commission on the Agencies’ 
Boards). 
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Second, a general shift in administrative policies, which is often 
labeled “from government to governance” occurred almost 
simultaneously on the national and federal level of European 
politics.74 The E.U. developed and established new models of public 
governance, often applying microeconomic models to public 
institutions.75 One of the most persuasive ideas in this context was 
the loosening of former hierarchical bureaucratic models.76 Europe 
increasingly recognized that the top-down approach of command and 
control administration was an inadequate regulatory technique for 
increasingly flexible and globalized industries.77 Throughout Europe 
regulatory agencies were often established as regulatory authorities 
in privatized markets, which had formerly been part of the public 
infrastructure.78
 74. See David Bach & Abraham L. Newman, The European Regulatory State 
and Global Public Policy: Micro-Institutions, Macro-Influence, 14 J. EUR. PUB. 
POL’Y 827, 827-28, 830 (2007) (arguing that growth in market competition 
facilitated the domestic shift to governance making coordination between those 
institutions necessary on a European level); Jens-Peter Schneider, Regulation and 
Europeanisation as Key Patterns of Change in Administrative Law, in THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN EUROPE 309, 317-18 (Matthias 
Ruffert ed., 2007) (commenting on the development of mutual trust among 
Member States that eliminates the need for detailed harmonization of 
administrative procedures); Christoph Möllers, European Governance: Meaning 
and Value of a Concept, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 313 (2006). 
 75. See Paul Magnette, The Politics of Regulation in the European Union, in 
REGULATION THROUGH AGENCIES IN THE EU: A NEW PARADIGM OF EUROPEAN 
GOVERNANCE 4-5 (Damien Geradin et al. eds., 2005) (describing the evolution 
from a post-war Keynesian state towards a regulatory state in which public 
authorities act based on a cost-benefit analysis). 
 76. See Majone, supra note 50, at 79-80, 156 (explaining that the growth of the 
regulatory state has reduced hierarchy because basic bureaucratic conflicts are 
externalized and characterizing deregulation and privatization as mechanisms that 
lead to less burdensome government intervention). 
 77. See Martin Lodge, The Europeanisation of Governance – Top Down, 
Bottom Up or Both?, in THE EUROPEANISATION OF GOVERNANCE 59, 67-71 
(Gunnar Folke Schuppert ed., 2006) (arguing that Europeanisation is inherently a 
combination of top-down and bottom-up regulation because of the relationship 
between the European government and the individual state governments). 
 78. See Thatcher, supra note 9, at 352-54 (using Germany, France, and Italy to 
examine the relationship between independent regulatory agencies); Giacinto Della 
Cananea, The Regulation of Public Services in Italy, 68 INT’L REV. OF ADMIN. SCI. 
73, 76 (2002) (connecting the history of regulatory agencies in Italy to 
privatization and liberalization in the country and the evolution of the single 
European market). 
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Third, the E.U. was looking for institutional responses to the 
heavy credibility crisis that struck the European bureaucracy in the 
mid-1990s. The crisis, which culminated in the Santer-Commission 
stepping down, grew out of a number of corruption cases, and 
increasing public suspicion of the opaque structures of the European 
bureaucracy.79 In an effort to overcome the crisis, the E.U. 
institutions undertook serious efforts to regain the trust of the 
European governments and peoples.80 Primarily the Commission was 
concerned with strengthening the accountability features of the E.U. 
bureaucracy. Recognizing the need for an alternative to the 
traditional rule-making process that is hampered by its loose and 
unstable committee structure involving a number of private actors 
with unclear legitimacy, the Commission’s White Paper on European 
Governance of 2001 proposed the establishment of agencies, stating: 
The creation of further autonomous E.U. regulatory agencies 
in clearly defined areas will improve the way rules are 
applied and enforced across the Union. Such agencies should 
be granted the power to take individual decisions in 
application of regulatory measures. They should operate with 
a degree of independence and within a clear framework 
established by the legislature. The regulation creating each 
agency should set out the limits of their activities and powers, 
their responsibilities and requirements for openness.81
In 2002 the Commission dealt in a specific Communication with 
the issue: 
[Agencies] would make the executive more effective at 
European level in highly specialized technical areas requiring 
 79. See CAROL HARLOW, ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 53-55 
(2002) (detailing allegations of fraud and mismanagement leading up to the 
Saunter scandal); see also Veith Mehde, Responsibility and Accountability in the 
European Commission, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 423, 424-26 (2003) (exploring 
accountability particularly with respect to the impact of resignation of an existing 
body). 
 80. Koen Lenaerts & Amaryllis Verhoeven, Institutional Balance as a 
Guarantee for Democracy in EU Governance, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE’S 
INTEGRATED MARKET 35, 61-64 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds., 
2002) (discussing the accountability and censure measures put in place following 
the Santer crisis). 
 81. Commission White Paper on European Governance, at 24, COM (2001) 
428 final (July 25, 2001) (emphasis omitted). 
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advanced expertise and continuity, credibility and visibility of 
public action . . . . The main advantage of using the agencies 
is that their decisions are based on purely technical 
evaluations of very high quality and are not influenced by 
political or contingent considerations.82
Strengthened and decentralized agencies were seen as a helpful 
and promising tool to improve regulation.83 Moreover, the 
Commission argued for the adoption of a legally formalized agency 
framework, including rules for the creation of agencies, their 
procedures, and their supervision.84 The successful process of 
institutional bargaining showed support for the strengthened 
European administrative sphere in the European Parliament.85 The 
Commission saw enhanced agency institutionalization as a favorable 
means to respond to the arguments against growing informal and 
uncontrolled powers.86 Yet the Council, given its nature as 
representative of the Member State governments, pushed strongly to 
ensure the decisive and enduring influence of those Member States.87 
Thus the Council in particular sought agency control through 
management boards dominated by Member State representatives, and 
 82. Communication from the Commission, The Operating Framework for the 
European Regulatory Agencies, at 5, COM (2002) 718 final (Nov. 12, 2002); see 
also Commission White Paper on European Governance, supra note 81, at 24 
(discussing the creation of autonomous regulatory agencies and their benefits over 
traditional processes). “The advantage of agencies is often their ability to draw on 
highly technical, sectoral know-how, the increased visibility they give for the 
sectors concerned (and sometimes the public) and the cost-savings that they offer 
to business. For the Commission, the creation of agencies is also a useful way of 
ensuring it focuses resources on core tasks.” Id. 
 83. Martin Shapiro, The Problems of Independent Agencies in the United States 
and the European Union, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 276, 282 (1997) (stating that E.U. 
agencies have the huge advantage of not being in Brussels and not being the 
Commission; they aim to be viewed as “Europe-wide epistemic communities . . . 
whose technical truths transcend politics”). 
 84. See Kelemen, supra note 47, at 182-83 (explaining that the Commission 
proposed the framework because the 2001 White Paper recommended creating a 
formal framework). 
 85. See id. at 179 (using the struggle over the design of management boards as 
an example of the complex political structure behind the growth of agencies). 
Distinct from the Commission and Council, the European Parliament demanded 
more transparency, procedure, and oversight. Id. 
 86. See id. at 185 (rationalizing the growing support for agencies as an antidote 
to the perceived loss of the Commission’s independence). 
 87. Id. at 179. 
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through integration of national regulatory authorities into the 
operations via a hub-and-spoke model.88 One could see the influence 
of the Council’s opinion in the modified standpoint found in the 
Commission’s 2005 proposal for an inter-institutional agreement on 
the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies,89 
which nevertheless failed.90
3. The Legal Basis of E.U. Agencies 
There is ongoing debate regarding the correct legal procedure used 
to establish agencies. In the 1970s and 1980s most agencies were 
based on Art. 308 TEC.91 This article provides an additional 
legislative competence for circumstances not explicitly mentioned in 
the Treaty, and requires a positive vote in the unanimous 
consultation procedure.92 An alternative and increasingly popular 
mode of agency setting applies specific sectoral provisions or Art. 95 
TEC, which refers to measures establishing the internal market, and 
to the qualified majority of the co-decision procedure under Art. 251 
TEC.93 The practical relevance of this discussion is enormous, since 
in the latter case a few vetos could bar the agency establishment.94 
E.U. officials and legal scholars tended to interpret Art. 95 TEC as a 
sufficient constitutional basis for creating E.U. agencies, such as in 
the context of the 2004 regulation reforming the European Medicines 
 88. Id. 
 89. Commission, Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the Operating 
Framework for the European Regulatory Agencies, at 6-7, COM (2005) 59 final 
(Feb. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Draft Interinstitutional Agreement]. 
 90. See The Way Forward, supra note 4, at 6 (describing the previous failure to 
create a common framework for the regulatory agencies). 
 91. Alexander Kreher, Agencies in the European Community – A Step Towards 
Administrative Integration in Europe, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 225 (1997). 
 92. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 308, Nov. 10, 1997, 
1997 O.J. (C 340) 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (creating the requirements for the 
Council to act unanimously and take appropriate measures when the Treaty does 
not provide necessary procedures). 
 93. See id. art. 95(1) (providing for the Council’s power to adopt measures 
creating and maintaining an internal market). 
 94. See George Tsebelis & Xenophon Yataganas, Veto Players and Decision-
making in the EU after Nice: Policy Stability and Bureaucratic/Judicial 
Discretion, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 283, 284-86 (2002) (calculating the new 
qualified majority requirements under the Treaty of Nice and showing that it would 
take only Germany, together with one large and one small country, to block any 
decision in the Council). 
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Agency.95 The European Court of Justice most recently dealt with 
the issue in the European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA) case.96 In that case, the United Kingdom had challenged the 
legality of ENISA, which the E.U. established in Regulation (EC) 
No. 460/2004, based on Article 95 TEC.97 The United Kingdom’s 
main argument had been that the ENISA-Regulation lacked the 
thematic connection to the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market, as required in the provision.98 The European Court 
of Justice dismissed the action, and found that the regulation framing 
ENISA was rightly based on Article 95 TEC.99 Accordingly the 
European Commission based its most recent initiative for a European 
agency to regulate the European telecommunication market on 
Article 95 TEC.100
An additional track of E.U. administration building that recently 
opened is the establishment of the so-called “executive agencies.” 
Despite the terminological similarity, these entities are very distinct 
from the E.U. agencies, and are rooted in a 2002 Regulation.101 
Acting on a minor level of supranational governance, they do not 
depend upon a legislative foundation through E.U. Council and 
European Parliament, but are set up directly by the European 
Commission. The existing “executive agencies,” such as the 
Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA), 
the Executive Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation (EACI), 
and the Executive Agency for the Public Health Programme (PHEA), 
are primarily entrusted with consulting tasks and providing specific 
 95. See Parliament & Council Regulation 726/2004, pmbl., 2004 O.J. (L 136) 
1, 1 (EC) (citing Article 95 of the Treaty establishing the European Community as 
the authority for the legislation creating the European Medicines Agency). 
 96. Case C-217/04, U.K. v. Parliament, 2006 E.C.R. I-03771. 
 97. Parliament & Council Regulation 460/2004, supra note 65, pmbl. 
 98. See Case C-217/04, U.K., 2006 E.C.R. I-03771, at ¶ ¶ 14-20. 
 99. See id. ¶ 67. The Court reasoned that Article 95 grants the Community 
legislature discretion for determining the appropriate methods of harmonizing 
community laws and regulations.  Id. ¶ 43.  This discretion includes the power to 
establish an agency. Id. ¶ 44. However, such agency’s functions must be “closely 
linked” to the harmonizing legislation. Id. ¶ 45. 
 100. See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council Establishing the European Electronic Communications Market 
Authority, at § 3.3, COM (2007) 699 rev. 2 (2007) (establishing Article 95 as the 
legal basis of the proposed regulation). 
 101. Council Regulation 58/2003, arts. 1, 2, 7, 2002 (L 11) 1, 2-3 (EC). 
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services, such as implementing the newly created Community 
trademark and industrial property regimes.102 Judged by their 
auxiliary task and function, the “executive agencies” resemble the 
first European agencies established in the 1970s.103
During the draft process for a European Constitutional Treaty 
between 2002 and 2004, a frequent topic of discussion was the locus 
of E.U. agencies in the system of European institutions. While the 
drafters of the Constitutional Treaty did not grant the E.U. agencies a 
preferred textual position comparable to the Council, the 
Commission, and the European Parliament,104 they nevertheless 
explicitly included the agencies in the proposed constitutional text, 
granting judicial review of their actions.  For example,  
Article III-270 of the Draft for the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe read: 
(1) The Court of Justice shall review the legality . . . of acts 
of bodies or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal 
effects vis-à-vis third parties. . . . (5) Acts setting up bodies 
and agencies of the Union may lay down specific conditions 
and arrangements concerning actions brought by natural or 
legal persons against acts of these bodies or agencies 
intended to produce legal effects.105
The case for institutionalization suffered a serious setback with the 
defeat of the draft for the E.U. Constitution in the 2005 French and 
 102. See Europa, Agencies of the EU, Executive Agencies, 
http://europa.eu/agencies/executive_agencies/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 
2008) (listing current executive agencies); see also Paul Craig, A New Framework 
for EU Administration: The Financial Regulation 2002, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
107, 116 (2004) (giving examples of tasks that can be assigned to executive 
agencies). 
 103. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing functions of the European Centre for the 
Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) and the European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound)). 
 104. See Bermann, supra note 12, at 446 (commenting on the dearth of 
references to independent agencies in the Constitutional Treaty); CURTIN, supra 
note 7, at 7 (noting that although the Constitutional Treaty aimed at creating a 
unified system of administration, it failed to “constitutionalize” such a framework). 
 105. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, art. III-270, July 13, 
2003, CONV 850/03, available at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/treaty/ 
cv00850.en03.pdf [hereinafter Draft Treaty]. 
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Dutch referenda.106 Interestingly, one can connect the defeat of the 
European constitution in France and the Netherlands to broad 
ignorance of the content of the draft for a Constitutional treaty. A 
Eurobarometer Poll conducted in 2004 reported that a third of the 
Europeans polled in the transnational survey had not even heard of 
the Convention, and that only eleven percent stated that they 
“broadly [knew] its contents. . . .”107 This indicates that only a small 
minority would likely be accurate and characterize the Convention’s 
product as a Constitutional Treaty, as opposed to an international law 
treaty. It also appears that the voters largely based their decisions on 
distrust of the E.U., possibly associating the European Union with 
lacking transparency and participation, ineffective bureaucracy, and 
unjustified transfers of sovereignty.108
 106. See, e.g., Dutch Say ‘No’ to EU Constitution, BBC NEWS, June 2, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4601439.stm (reporting that voters’ concerns 
revolved around too much centralized power at the expense of national 
sovereignty). 
 107. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 214: THE FUTURE 
CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 3-4 (Mar. 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public 
_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_214_en.pdf [hereinafter SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 
214]; see also Achim Hurrelmann, European Democracy, the ‘Permissive 
Consensus’ and the Collapse of the EU Constitution, 13 EUR. L.J. 343, 353 (2007) 
(providing further empirical studies and polls illustrating an EU-wide dichotomy 
between trust in national institutions and E.U. institutions); Neil Walker, After the 
Constitutional Moment, 16 (The Federation Trust Constitutional Online Paper 
Series No. 32/03 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=516783 (suggesting that, whatever the causes of the voters’ ignorance 
of the treaty’s contents, it is indicative of the voters’ “skepticism about the viability 
of European political community”). 
 108. See SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 214, supra note 107, at 27 (reporting 37% 
Europeans who voted “no” in the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty were 
fearful of the “loss of national sovereignty); see also Mark Bovens, New Forms of 
Accountability and EU-Governance, 5 COMP. EUR. POL. 104, 104 (2007) 
(attributing the low level of legitimacy of the E.U., in part, to past “accountability 
deficits” and the current debate over transparency and accountability in EU 
governance); Gilles Ivaldi, Beyond France’s 2005 Referendum on the European 
Constitutional Treaty: Second-Order Model, Anti-Establishment Attitudes and the 
End of the Alternative European Utopia, 29 W. EUR. POL. 47, 49 (2006) 
(connecting the failure of the referendum in France to an anti-Establishment 
attitude and a backlash against the process of European integration). 
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C. DECENTRALIZATION AND DECONCENTRATION 
The broad establishment of E.U. agencies affected the 
organizational dimension of European administrative law in various 
ways. Presumably the two most important consequences are the 
deconcentration and decentralization of European administration. 
First considering the deconcentrating effects, European 
administration is no longer processed only by the Commission and 
institutions such as the European Central Bank, but now also by 
European Union agencies. The agencies are not regularly managed 
by officials of the Commission, but rather by independent executive 
directors and management boards that are nominated in a specific 
procedure, involving various actors such as the Member States and 
the European parliament.109 The notion that most of the tasks of 
newly established E.U. agencies were not formerly administered by 
the European Commission, but instead by the E.U. Member States, 
does not mitigate the deconcentration-thesis, because this claim  
draws primarily on the crucial organizational innovation of 
independent administrative entities beside the Commission, rather 
than on the federal division of powers between the European level 
and Member States. 
Second, the new agency structure decentralizes European 
administration. The new agencies were not set up in Brussels, but 
were instead established in cities all over Europe, including 
Thessaloniki in Greece (European Reconstruction Agency, 2000), 
Valenciennes and Lille in France (European Railway Agency, 2004), 
Vigo in Spain (Community Fisheries Control Agency, 2005), and 
Stockholm in Sweden (European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control, 2005).110 Through the decentralized agencies, the Member 
States are able to participate directly in the day-to-day practice of 
 109. See CRAIG, supra note 3, at 172-73 (describing the nomination and 
appointment process for agency leadership, and the degree to which the 
Commission’s power to control appointments to agency leadership positions has 
declined in response to demands for increased independence and expertise in the 
agency’s area of authority). 
 110. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU AGENCIES: WHATEVER YOU DO, WE 
WORK FOR YOU 3-27 (2007), http://bookshop.europa.eu/eGetRecords?Template= 
en_publication_details&UID=533745 [hereinafter EU AGENCIES] (providing 
contact details and work descriptions for the various EU agencies). 
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European administration, rather than merely through their delegates 
to Brussels-based authorities.111 The European Commission finds 
particular value in the notion that “the spread of agencies beyond 
Brussels and Luxembourg adds to the visibility of the Union.”112 
Even though the new agencies were not excessively large 
bureaucracies—oftentimes they count between 300 and 500 
employees—there were undeniably positive socio-economic effects 
accompanying each new agency, in terms of construction work on 
new buildings, new jobs in sciences and services, visitors to the 
agency, and media publicity for the hosting city. As a consequence, 
the Member States apparently strive to host as many agencies as 
possible. A notable story in this vein happened in 2002, when the 
European Commission intended to set up the new European Food 
Safety Agency (EFSA) in Finland. This plan was strongly opposed 
by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who finally succeeded in 
his colorful campaign in favor of the city of Parma.113  In exchange, 
the European Chemicals Agency was ultimately established in 
Helsinki.114
D. THE LOCUS OF AGENCIES IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED 
ADMINISTRATION 
The institutional changes that occurred over time formed a specific 
supranational profile of administration. Neither the Comitology 
committees nor the E.U. agencies took the shape of autonomous 
 111. See Hofmann & Türk, supra note 23, at 87 (characterizing decentralized 
European agencies as forums for facilitating co-operation between national and 
supranational authorities to improve integration and competence in various 
regulatory fields of operation). 
 112. The Way Forward, supra note 4, at 2. 
 113. Laurie Buonanno, The Creation of the European Food Safety Authority, in 
WHAT’S THE BEEF: THE CONTESTED GOVERNANCE OF EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY 
259 (Christopher Ansell & David Vogel eds., 2006) (recounting briefly the 
opposition to establishing the EFSA in Finland, and Finland’s argument that 
member states lacking an E.U. agency were entitled to preference in site selection 
for newly authorized agencies under the Edinburgh Council decision of 1992, an 
argument that was ultimately overcome by President Berlusconi’s efforts on behalf 
of Parma). 
 114. See EU Business, European Chemicals Agency ECHA - Guide, 
http://www.eubusiness.com/Chemicals/echa-guide.01/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2008) 
(reporting that Finland was lobbying to have either the Chemicals Agency or the 
Food Safety Authority located in Helsinki). 
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federal entities. Instead, both appear as nodal points within an 
interacting system of a European “network administration,” 
encompassing supranational and national regulatory authorities.115 
Broadly speaking, this picture of executive powers exercised by the 
Council of ministers forming “the government,” the formal 
bureaucracy, and a “plethora of other agencies and firms to which 
power has been transferred,” mirrors the nature of the E.U., which 
has always been characterized by an interinstitutional balance of 
power rather than the separation of powers.116 Recently Sabino 
Cassese identified the agencies as the second of three forms of 
cooperation between the European level and individual national 
administrations. Cassese’s account distinguishes between: 
[1] [J]oint administration . . . characterized by . . . a  
hybrid—part supranational, part national—administrative 
apparatus117. . . . [2] [D]ecentralized administration . . . 
characterized by parallel, non-exclusive legal powers vested 
in both the Community and the Member States, together with 
a single administrative apparatus [that is] a European 
agency118 . . . . [And] [3] [T]he regulatory concert [in which] 
national and supranational authorities make up a common 
organization.119
An additional pattern of administrative cooperation is made up of 
transgovernmental networks comprised of national regulatory
 115. See Hofmann & Türk, supra note 23, at 88 (characterizing European 
agencies as unlike the independent, autonomous model employed by U.S. 
regulatory agencies in that they each typically engage in a wide range of diverse 
activities that frequently intersect and overlap with other agencies’ interests to 
form a diffuse network of administration). 
 116. See Paul Craig, European Governance: Executive and Administrative 
Powers Under the New Constitutional Settlement, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 407, 434-35 
(2005) (presenting arguments for and against shared/divided executive power in 
the EU). 
 117. See Cassese, supra note 10, at 22 (citing “the administration of structural 
funds as an example of this form of cooperation”). 
 118. See id. (declaring European efforts to combat illegal drugs to be an 
example of this form of decentralized administration). 
 119. See id. (providing as an example of the regulatory concert the 
telecommunication sector and the functioning of the heads of Member State 
authorities as members of a “European Regulatory Group” in Brussels). 
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authorities, oftentimes formally embedded in the supranational 
policymaking process.120
II. ACCOUNTABILITY FEATURES 
The rise of the agency system did not remain unchallenged. 
Accountability concerns were especially linked to judicial review, 
and to the delegation limits of the Meroni doctrine.121 Yet a closer 
inquiry into the profiles of specific E.U. agencies reveals quite a 
remarkable and diverse system of accountability features. The 
European Commission undertook several attempts to overcome the 
diversification of accountability regimes, which remained largely 
unsuccessful.122 Despite the ongoing diversity, the accountability 
regimes significantly strengthened in the latest generation of E.U. 
agencies during the 2000s. This increase corresponds with the overall 
evolution of E.U. agency powers from the 1970s over the 1990s and 
beyond. 
A. UNITY AND DIVERSITY OF ACCOUNTABILITY REGIMES: 
 TWO CASE STUDIES 
The presentations of the following case studies are to illustrate the 
convergences and divergences in the institutional design of European 
agencies in detail, focusing particularly on the accountability 
 120. See Burkard Eberlein & Abraham Newman, Escaping the International 
Governance Dilemma? Incorporated Transgovernmental Networks in the 
European Union, 21 GOVERNANCE 25, 26 (2008) (arguing for a superior approach 
to analyzing issues of international coordination, especially in the EU context, 
where national governments have not entirely transferred regulatory power to the 
supranational institutions). 
 121. See CURTIN, supra note 7, at 9; HARLOW, supra note 79, at 75 (arguing that 
because most agencies’ powers were limited to information-gathering functions, 
they presented “little threat to either transparency or accountability”); The Way 
Forward, supra note 4, at 5 (reiterating the Meroni limitations on agencies’ powers 
and stressing the continuing “need for clear lines of accountability to govern 
agencies’ actions”). 
 122. See Commission White Paper on European Governance, supra note 81, at 
3, 6 (proposing a plan to foster consistency in E.U. policy); Communication from 
the Commission, The Operating Framework for the European Regulatory 
Agencies, supra note 82, at 2 (calling for European institutions to be refocused in 
terms of responsibilities and current practices); Draft Interinstitutional Agreement, 
supra note 89, at 2 (seeking to strengthen E.U. agencies by establishing “common 
core of principles and rules” and creating a “clear system of controls”). 
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regimes123 of the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) in London, 
and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in Cologne, as 
two significant examples of E.U. agencies. The institutional design 
of the EMEA and the EASA are representative for the development 
of competences and control mechanisms over time. The EMEA 
stems from the wave of agency founding in the early 1990s, and is an 
agency with limited formal powers, but great de facto powers.124 To 
the contrary, the EASA was founded in 2002 and is currently the 
most powerful European agency, particularly because it is the first 
authority beyond the Commission with formal licensing powers.125 
Functionally, both agencies deal with the licensing of products—the 
former with pharmaceuticals and the latter with airplanes. But as will 
become clear, they do it in very different ways. Both agencies are 
entrusted with tasks that were formerly exercised on the national 
level,126 and both operate on a fee-based mechanism, whereby the 
fees that they charge cover most of the costs.127
 123. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some 
Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, 
DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 118-20 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) 
(defining accountability regimes as legal and social constraints applied across 
various contexts). 
 124. See EU AGENCIES, supra note 110, at 22 (describing European Medicines 
Agency’s role as a facilitator in licensing pharmaceutical products while the 
Commission retains licensing power). 
 125. See id. at 8 (describing the broad and growing responsibilities of the 
EASA). 
 126. JOHN ABRAHAM & GRAHAM LEWIS, REGULATING MEDICINES IN EUROPE: 
COMPETITION, EXPERTISE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 43, 80 (2000); DANIEL RIEDEL, 
DIE GEMEINSCHAFTSZULASSUNG FÜR LUFTFAHRTGERÄT passim (2006). 
 127. See Statement of Revenue and Expenditure of the European Medicines 
Agency for the Financial Year 2005, 2005 O.J. (L 096) 366 [hereinafter Statement 
of Revenue] (detailing EMEA revenues for financial year 2004 and showing about 
sixty-seven percent of revenues in fees); European Aviation Safety Agency, 
Annual Accounts for the Year 2006, at 5, http://www.easa.eu.int/ws_prod/g/doc/ 
Finance/Annual%20accounts%202006_MB0907.pdf (reporting EASA’s income 
from fees in 2006 at about fifty percent of total operating revenue); see also Vos, 
Agencies and the European Union, supra note 55, at 121-22 (noting that although 
EMEA revenues from fees have grown over the years, the agency strives to stay 
independent from the pharmaceutical industry by relying at least in part on E.U. 
funding); Statement of Revenue, supra, at 5 (reporting EASA’s income from fees 
in 2006 at about fifty percent of total operating revenue). 
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1. European Medicines Agency (EMEA) 
The E.U. primarily entrusted the European Medicines Agency and 
its approximately 440 staff members128 with providing opinions in 
the field of pharmaceutical licensing.129 The “Centralized European 
Procedure” provides the applicant (usually a pharmaceutical 
company such as Novartis, Pfizer or BASF) with a license that is 
valid in all E.U. Member States, and is mandatory for an increasing 
range of pharmaceuticals explicitly mentioned in the basic 
regulation.130 For all other pharmaceuticals the “Centralized 
European Procedure” is voluntary. The national pharmaceutical 
authorities remain in existence, and remain indispensable in terms of 
law enforcement, even if the significance with regard to licensing is 
decreasing.131 Having a European license makes perfect sense in 
most cases. According to the association of researching 
pharmaceutical companies in Germany, the invention and 
development of every new pharmaceutical takes an estimated ten to 
twelve years, and costs 800 million Euros.132 Since no domestic 
European market is big enough for refinancing these expenses, the 
economic success of every single pharmaceutical depends on its 
distribution in other European countries and beyond.133 The 
European license is formally issued by the European Commission—
 128. EU AGENCIES, supra note 110. 
 129. See id.; Parliament & Council Regulation 726/2004, supra note 95, art. 57 
(charging EMEA with giving scientific advice to Member States and E.U. 
institutions). 
 130. See Parliament & Council Regulation 726/2004, supra note 95, art. 6, 
Annex (extending the centralized Procedure to new pharmaceuticals including 
diabetes, aids, cancer and neurodegenerative disorders). 
 131. See European Commission, Enterprise and Industry, Enterprise Europe No 
19, Single Market, Health in Safety (2005), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ 
library/enterprise-europe/issue19/articles/en/topic10_en.htm (estimating EMEA’s 
current share of scientific assessments of medicines in E.U. at about sixty percent 
and predicting its share to increase to over ninety percent in the future). 
 132. Verband Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller E.V., Die Revision der EG-
Arzneimittelgesetzgebung – Herausforderungen und Chancen für Patienten, 
Zulassungsbehörden und die pharmazeutische Industrie, http://www.vfa.de/de/ 
politik/artikelpo/revision2005.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2008). 
 133. See ABRAHAM & LEWIS, supra note 126, at 31-33, 81-82 (explaining the 
pharmaceutical industry’s lobbying efforts for centralized transnational regulation 
as resulting from political pressure to reduce cost of medicines). 
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which relies heavily on the agency.134 The vote of the agency and its 
sub-committees cannot be ignored.135 In the words of  a leading 
expert on European regulatory regimes: “the Commission 
systematically rubber-stamps EMEA recommendations—apparently 
without even discussing them . . . .”136
The agency hosts several expert committees comprised of 
representatives—usually members of the national medicines 
authorities—from the Member States.137 Practical examples include 
the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP), and 
additional specific Committees for Pharmaceuticals for Veterinary 
Use and Herbal Pharmaceuticals.138 Within the licensing process the 
Committees play a pivotal role, since within the agency they are 
often entrusted with developing and giving the substantive opinion 
for a certain pharmaceutical.139 The opinion of the Committee 
includes a recommendation to the European Commission to either 
grant or refuse the permission for the new pharmaceutical, and is 
published on the EMEA’s website (“recommendation for EU-
approval”).140 Regularly the next and final step is granting the market 
 
 134. See Parliament & Council Regulation 726/2004, supra note 95, art. 10 
(authorizing the European Commission to approve medicinal products for human 
use based on the guidance of the EMEA). 
 135. See Vos, Agencies and the European Union, supra note 55, at 121 (stating 
that while the EMEA’s powers are advisory, its scientific expertise bears heavily in 
Commission decision making). 
 136. Dehousse, supra note 2, at 223. 
 137. Parliament & Council Regulation 726/2004, supra note 95, art. 87. 
 138. See European Medicines Agency, About EMEA – Structure, supra note 63 
(listing five committees). 
 139. See JÜRGEN FEICK, REGULATORY RATIONALISATION AND LEGITIMATION IN 
THE FACE OF INTERESTS, INFLUENCE AND INSTITUTIONAL DE-POLITICISATION – 
MARKET ENTRY REGULATION FOR PHARMACEUTICALS IN THE EU 6-8 (2004), 
http://www.mpifg.de/people/jf/downloads/Conference%20Paper%20Januar%2020
03.pdf (noting that “the Centralized Procedure is reserved for especially innovative 
medicinal products”). 
 140. See European Medicines Agency, Human Medicines – CHMP Summaries 
of Opinion, http://www.emea.europa.eu/htms/human/opinion/opinion.htm (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2008) (listing positive and negative opinions of the committee). 
See also Sebastian Krapohl, Credible Commitment in Non-Independent Regulatory 
Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of the European Agencies for Pharmaceuticals 
and Foodstuffs, 10 EUR. L.J. 518, 531-33 (2004) (detailing the path pharmaceutical 
licensing applications take for an ultimate decision in favor or against). 
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authorization in the form of a Commission Decision issued by the 
European Commission.141
Against the backdrop of the small administrative body of the 
European Medicines Agency, the Committee-procedure is a 
remarkable mechanism of incorporating Member State expertise into 
the agency. Making use of knowledge and experience gathered in the 
E.U. Member States appears to efficiently deal with the scarcity of 
the agency’s own human resources.142 The very same mechanism of 
integrating national officials into the agency’s licensing procedure 
also enables the Member State to exercise informal controls into the 
day-to-day-practice on the European level.143
One very controversial aspect is whether judicial review is 
available against a negative agency-opinion on a specific 
pharmaceutical. So far the European Courts only grant standing for 
suits contesting EMEA decisions. For example in the 2006 Albert 
Albrecht case the European Court of First Instance granted standing 
 
 141. See Antoine Cuvillier, The Role of the European Medicines Evaluation 
Agency in the Harmonisation of Pharmaceutical Regulation, in PHARMACEUTICAL 
MEDICINE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND EUROPEAN LAW 137, 143 (Richard Goldberg & 
Julian Lonbay eds., 2000) (explaining the centralized procedure for authorizations 
under the EMEA, beginning with application directly to the EMEA and 
culminating in the final decision by the European Commission). 
 142. See Mario P. Chiti, Forms of European Administrative Action, 68 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 45 (2004) (observing that the cooperation between national 
and European agencies “obviates the need to expand the core civil service at the 
European level”). 
 143. See CRAIG, supra note 3, at 178 (discussing the roles of players at the 
national, Community, and international level and how their interactions can affect 
policymaking and implementation). 
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to a joint venture of pharmaceutical companies against an EMEA 
decision requiring a company to provide certain information and to 
pay fees.144 To the contrary, the European Courts have constantly 
refused standing against EMEA opinions, and always referred to the 
formally decisive act of the European Commission.145 Some lawyers 
have challenged this jurisprudence, claiming that opinions issued by 
the EMEA could be challenged under Article 230, Section 1 of the 
TEC.146 Since the text of Article 230 does not include actions of 
agencies, extensive interpretation of this provision would be 
required. Indeed, several ECJ cases provide for an extended 
interpretation of Article 230. In Les Verts, the ECJ ruled in 1986 that 
an act of the European Parliament could be subject to judicial review 
despite the lack of a specific provision in the TEC.147 As an 
argument, the ECJ referred to the community’s commitment to the 
rule of law.148 In addition, the European Court of First Instance 
recently stated, in Sogelma, that this ruling is not limited to the 
institutions in Article 7 TEC.149 Yet the Court of First Instance 
rejected the idea of an extended Article 230 TEC interpretation in 
2003 in the Olivieri case.150  In that case Ms. Olivieri, a physician 
 144. See Case T-19/02, Albert Albrecht GmbH & Co. KG v. Comm’n, 2006 
E.C.R. 0, ¶¶ 31, 41 (observing that the questions of law raised in this action, 
including the EMEA’s capacity to be sued, “have not yet been definitively 
decided”). 
 145. See, e.g., Case T-133/03, Scherig-Plough Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2008 O.J. (C 37) 
32, ¶¶ 1, 2 (dismissing an action for the annulment of an EMEA measure refusing 
a type variation of a pharmaceutical). 
 146. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the  European Community, 
art. 230, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [hereinafter Consolidated Treaty] (declaring that 
“[t]he Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the 
European Parliament and the Council, of acts of the Council, of the Commission 
and of the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the 
European Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties”). 
 147. See Case 294/83, Patri Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, ¶¶ 21, 
23-25 (holding that neither Member States nor E.U. institutions can avoid judicial 
review of measures adopted by them) . 
 148. Id. 
 149. Case T-411/06, Sogelma v. European Agency for Reconstruction, 2008 
E.C.R. 0, ¶ 37 (extending ECJ’s holding in Les Verts to any E.U. institution as long 
as they are “endowed with the power to take measures intended to produce legal 
effects vis-à-vis third parties”). 
 150. See Case T-326/99, Nancy Fern Olivieri, v. Comm’n, 2004 O.J. (C 71) 39 
(dismissing the plaintiff’s application as inadmissible); see also Case T-326/99, 
Nancy Fern Olivieri v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. II-1985 (including a larger 
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and distributor of pharmaceuticals, challenged the negative opinion 
that the EMEA and its Committee for Proprietary Medicinal 
Products (CPMP) issued on the pharmaceutical she had applied 
for.151 In order to meet the admissibility standards, Ms. Olivieri 
relied in particular on the ECJ’s ruling in Les Verts, and argued that 
the EMEA was an “auxiliary body vested with specific powers of an 
administrative nature” (in the sense of earlier rulings of the ECJ), 
subject to judicial review according to Article 230.152 However, the 
crucial point for an applicant like Ms. Olivieri is the legally binding 
effect of the EMEA opinion at stake, which here she was unable to 
prove.153
Because of the constant rejection of motions directly against 
negative EMEA opinions, applicants filed a large majority of 
motions challenging dismissals of pharmaceutical applications 
directly against the succeeding Commission Decision. The central 
case in that area is the 2002 Artegodan decision,154 where the Court 
of First Instance not only agreed to hear a claim against a negative 
decision of the Commission on a pharmaceutical application, but also 
held that effective review requires exploration beyond the 
Commission’s formal decision into the findings of the agency and its 
consideration of the standing issue heard during the interim hearing). 
 151. Case T-326/99, Olivieri, 2000 E.C.R. II-1985, ¶¶ 14-24. 
 152. Case T-326/00, Nancy Fern Olivieri v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-6053,  
¶ 49. 
 153. See id. ¶¶ 53-54 (finding that because EMEA’s opinion in that case was not 
a final but an intermediate measure, it could not be challenged under Le Verts). See 
also Case T-264/07, CSL Behring v. Comm’n, 2007 O.J. (C 235) 22 (challenging a 
letter sent by the EMEA to the plaintiff, who regarded it as the agency’s legally 
binding refusal to continue the procedure for designating the applicant’s medicinal 
product as an orphan medicinal product). This is another interesting recent action 
brought up by a German pharmaceutical company directly against the EMEA 
which hasn’t been decided yet and approaches the problem on the basis of slightly 
different facts.  Id. 
 154. See Joined Cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00 to T-85/00, T-132/00, T-
137/00, & T-141/00, Artegodan GmbH v. Comm’n, 2003 O.J. (C 19) 53 (seeking 
annulment of a Commission decision to withdraw marketing authorizations for 
certain products); see also Case T-237/03, Merck Sharp & Dohme v. Comm’n, 
2006 O.J. (C 86) 48; Case T-179/00, A. Menarini – Industrie Farmaceutice Riunite 
Srl v. Comm’n, 2002 O.J. (C 202) 30 (annulling a Commission Decision to 
disallow the plaintiff’s request to display its logo on the packaging for a 
pharmaceutical product). 
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committee, here the EMEA and the CPMP.155 With that, the court 
acknowledged the tremendous factual importance of the agency’s 
opinion, and stated that the Commission would necessarily have to 
follow the agency—unless it could come up with elaborate reasoning 
pointing to the contrary.156
The Artegodan case also shows another feature of legal 
accountability, which is the margin of deference that the European 
Courts grant toward the agency’s action.157 The higher the margin of 
deference, the less legally accountable the agency is.158 In the context 
of technology and risk regulation there regularly are strong forces 
pushing for judicial deference, in order to enhance the agency’s 
flexibility and strengthen the scientific expertise. The 
groundbreaking judgment in the American context is Chevron, where 
the U.S. Supreme Court justified deference to the statutory 
interpretation of an agency on the grounds of agency expertise and 
democratic accountability.159 Yet the Artegodan case indicates that 
the Court of First Instance can grant deference to the scientific 
judgment of the EMEA only to a limited extent. Whereas the ECJ 
generally acknowledges the necessities implied in the EU’s 
commitment to the precautionary principle, it does point to the limits 
of deference as well, and states: “[t]hat choice must, however comply 
 155. Case T-74/00, Artegodan GmbH v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-494, ¶¶ 197-
200 (declaring that any illegality in the CPMP’s opinion will render the 
Commission’s decision based on it unlawful). 
 156. Id. ¶¶ 199, 201, 211, 220 (elaborating that in addition to evaluating the 
CPMP’s opinion, the court must review whether the Commission has, in turn, 
exercised its discretion). 
 157. Case C-39/03 P, Comm’n v Artegodan GmbH, 2003 O.J. (C 202) 2 
(dismissing the appeal of the European Commission against the judgment of the 
Court of First Instance). 
 158. See Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative 
Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 628, 692-96 (1999) (reciting an ECJ decision that prohibited the 
Commission from issuing decisions on scientific matters without consulting 
relevant scientific committees and arguing that such decisions grant too much 
power to politically unaccountable bodies). 
 159. See Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984) (holding that deference should be given to agency decisions in instances 
where a statute is silent or ambiguous on a particular issue, and the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable). See generally Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource 
Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2008) (exploring the 
implications of Chevron deference for an agency’s accountability). 
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with the principle that the protection of public health, safety and the 
environment is to take precedence over economic interests . . . .”160 
Thus the ECJ examines the scientific findings of the EMEA and its 
Committee on which the Commission’s decision was based, and 
explores whether the scientific findings were sufficiently 
conclusive.161 On the national level, judicial review is available 
against decisions of national authorities that are implementing or 
enforcing the European standards. However, in the day-to-day 
practice of the national courts, most of the cases in which individuals 
or organizations are challenging the national authorities with regard 
to the enforcement of European pharmaceutical law are different.162 
It is rather that the non-enforcement of European law is claimed. 
This happens typically when the national authorities are prohibiting 
the purchase or use of a pharmaceutical which has been licensed by 
the European Commission (on basis of an EMEA recommendation). 
In response, the national pharmaceutical authority will argue that it is 
making use of an exceptional entitlement provided directly in the 
European regulation or directive, such as on the grounds of public 
health and safety.163
2. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
Like the EMEA, the EASA is entitled to issue the certificates for 
the licensed products under its own name and authority. The E.U. 
established the EASA in the early 2000s under the political rationale 
 160. Case T-74/00, Artegodan GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. II-494, ¶ 186. 
 161. See id. ¶ 200 (recognizing that while it cannot “substitute its own 
assessment for that of the CPMP,” the court can determine whether the agency’s 
opinion was based on sufficient reasons and whether there was a causal link 
between those reasons and the agency’s ultimate conclusions). See also MARIA 
LEE, EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CHALLENGES, CHANGE AND DECISION-MAKING 
104-05 (2005) (finding courts use the precautionary principle to conduct detailed 
reviews of the evidence and facts an agency used to reach a decision); CRAIG, 
supra note 3, at 429-32 (analyzing judicial review in matters of law, fact, and 
discretion under EU law, and the close degree of scrutiny required of factual 
findings). 
 162. See, e.g., XYZ v. Schering Health Care Ltd., (2002) EWHC 1420 (QB), 
2002 WL 1446183, ¶¶ 2, 15-16 (claiming certain representations of pharmaceutical 
companies in the U.K. diverged from an opinion of the CPMP). 
 163. See, e.g., Council Directive 1993/42, Art. 8 Sec. 1 (allowing for appropriate 
interim measures to withdraw medical devices from the market, if these devices 
may compromise the health and/or safety of patients or users). 
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that a genuine European single market in air transport services 
demands common safety rules and harmonized standards of 
implementation.164 The agency is located in Cologne, and has about 
400 staff.165 The national aviation authorities are embedded in an 
emerging administrative network built up by EASA and the relevant 
Member State agencies, which maintain a set of competences. From 
a functional point of view, EASA is both a decision-making and a 
quasi-rulemaking agency. In its decision-making function, the 
agency issues type-certificates with regard to the airworthiness of 
specific airplanes, and issues environmental certificates for aircraft 
products.166 In 2008, the licensing powers of the EASA were further 
extended to include the licensing of pilots on the basis of their 
compliance with essential requirements on theoretical knowledge, 
practical skill, language proficiency and experience,167 and the 
regulation of the operation of aircraft.168
The EASA airworthiness license is a model license for the airplane 
type in general, which EASA crafts according to the model license is 
issued by the Member States. Like the EMEA, the EASA is 
supported by two consultative bodies. First there is the Advisory 
Group of National Aviation Authorities (AGNA), second there is the 
Safety Standards Consultative Committee (SSCC), which is mostly 
comprised of private experts coming from the airplane industry.169
In the rulemaking area, there are patterns similar to the context of 
the EMEA. There is also an ongoing tension between limited formal 
competences and tremendous de facto powers. The EASA has 
several tasks at different legal levels. First, the agency makes 
 164. See Parliament & Council Regulation 216/2008, supra note 66, pmbl, ¶ 1 
(stating that common aviation regulations will promote “free movement of goods, 
persons and organisations in the internal market”). 
 165. See EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY, MULTI-ANNUAL STAFF POLICY 
PLAN 2008–2010 4, 9 (2007), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/tran20070410_easa_staff_en/tran20070410_e
asa_staff_en.pdf (reporting total staff of 467 in 2007). 
 166. See Parliament & Council Regulation 216/2008, supra note 67, arts. 18, 20 
(requiring the EASA to issue airworthiness and environmental certification 
specifications according to guidelines established in the regulation). 
 167. See id. art. 7, Annex III (establishing certification guidelines for pilots). 
 168. See id. art. 8, Annex IV (setting standards for aircraft operation). 
 169. See id. art. 65 (authorizing a committee empowered to assist the 
Commission in the decision-making process). 
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proposals for changes of the Agencies Basic Regulation, which also 
include the basic requirements for the security of airplanes.170 
Second, the agency proposes rules that are formally issued by the 
Commission.171 Third, the agency issues under its own name 
“certification specifications, including airworthiness codes and 
means of compliance . . . to be used in the certification process.”172 
The EASA proposals are not considered binding on all three 
levels;173 however, it seems fair to classify the EASA as a quasi-
rulemaking agency.174 In spite of the formal classification, the factual 
 
 170. See id. art. 18, ¶ 2 (requiring the Agency to prepare recommendations for 
amending the Regulation 216/2008 for the Commission). 
 171. See id. art. 19, ¶ 1 (authorizing the Agency to develop certification 
specifications and guidance material to be used in the certification process); 
Commission Regulation 1702/2003, pmbl., ¶ 8, 2003 O.J. (L 243) 6 (EC) (laying 
down implementing rules for the airworthiness and environmental certification of 
aircraft in accordance with EASA’s opinion); Commission Regulation 335/2007, 
pmbl., ¶ 8, 2007 O.J. (L 88) 40 (EC) (amending Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003 
and acknowledging that it is doing so based on EASA’s opinion). 
 172. See Parliament & Council Regulation 216/2008, supra note 66, art. 19, ¶ 2  
(providing that Agency proposals must reflect the state of the art and best industry 
practices, as well as be updated in accordance with worldwide aircraft experience). 
 173. See id. pmbl., ¶ 22 (stating that the EASA should “assist” the Commission 
in the preparation of the necessary legislation). 
 174. See Deirdre Curtin, Delegation to EU Non-Majoritarian Agencies and 
Emerging Practices of Public Accountability, in REGULATION THROUGH AGENCIES 
IN THE EU, supra note 64, at 88, 95 (commenting on the degree of independence of 
the new regulatory agencies that are allowed to promulgate rules that are binding 
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significance of the EASA-proposals is tremendous, because the 
airplane industry is complying with the agency’s specifications—
whether they are declared to be formally binding or not.175 Another 
point that shows the de facto character of a real rule-making agency 
is that the EASA is the first agency with an explicit “rule-making 
department” that is headed by a “rule-making director.”176 Moreover, 
the EASA is the first entity in the history of E.U. agencies that has 
powers to conduct “standardisation inspections of Member States 
competent authorities.”177 The EASA is also empowered to charge 
fees for its work.178
Interestingly, the expansion of tasks and competences in the 
institutional design of the EASA, as compared to the 1990s agencies, 
is accompanied by a simultaneous increase of formalization and 
juridification. For example, the rule-making process is subject to a 
quite remarkable notice and comment system that is provided 
through the EASA website.179 The judicial review is also 
tremendously enhanced into a two-step-system. An internal Board of 
Appeals within the agency will grant access to rejected applicants for 
airworthiness certificates.180 The Board of Appeals is ready to hear 
appeals against agency decisions pursuant to Articles 15 
on third parties); see also Larouche, supra note 64, at 95 (contending that 
European Regulatory Agencies were to be regarded as autonomous from the 
Commission but performing part of the Commission’s own executive duties). 
 175. See Parliament & Council Regulation 216/2008, supra note 66, art. 4 
(requiring industry compliance with the Basic Regulation and, therefore, with 
EASA’s specifications issued in accordance with the Regulation). 
 176. EASA, Rulemaking Directorate, http://www.easa.eu.int/ws_prod/r/r_ 
main.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2008) (listing the department’s structure and 
competencies). 
 177. See Parliament & Council Regulation 216/2008, supra note 67, art. 54 
(requiring Member States to “submit to the inspections and . . . ensure that bodies 
or persons concerned also submit to them”); Vos, supra note 55, at 121 (noting 
EASA was the first EU agency that was empowered to conduct inspections of 
Member States). 
 178. See generally Commission Regulation 593/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 140) 3 (EC) 
(providing that fees and charges may be levied by the Agency only and that 
Agency revenues and expenditures should be in balance). 
 179. See Parliament & Council Regulation 216/2008, supra note 67, art. 52 
(requiring EASA to consult with interested parties and Member States when 
issuing its opinions, specifications, and guidelines). 
 180. See id. arts. 40, 44 (establishing the Board of Appeals and allowing the 
agency to suspend the application of a challenged decision). 
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(Airworthiness and Environmental Certification), 46 (Investigations 
or Undertakings for application of Article 15) or 53 (Fees or charges 
regulation). A negative decision of the Board of Appeals is 
appealable to the Court of First Instance.181 By and large the affected 
European industries thoroughly evaluated the system of judicial 
review established in the EASA Basic Regulation. Several times the 
EASA system was recommended as a role model for the future 
design of succeeding agency foundations, such as in the case of the 
European Chemicals Agency.182 The number of ECJ and CFI cases 
involving the EASA has remained relatively small thus far, partly 
because the agency was only recently established and partly because 
the manufacturers involved are trying to solve potential conflicts 
long before even thinking of a lawsuit. One of the first cases 
involving the EASA as a party was the Andrade Sena case, which 
dealt not with the licensing process, but with the internal 
organization of the agency.183
A recent ECJ case which exemplifies the practical importance and 
application of the rulemaking activities of the EASA is in the Danish 
case Kramme v. SAS Scandinavian Airlines Denmark A/S.184 In this 
case a passenger sued the airline for compensation for a canceled 
flight,185 thereby demanding remedies granted in a European 
regulation.186 The norms governing the case included an 
implementing Commission regulation that incorporated standards 
 181. See id. art. 50 (allowing actions for the annulment of EASA’s decisions to 
be brought before the Court of Justice, but only after all appeals within the Agency 
have been exhausted); see also id. art. 51 (opening up the way to the Court of 
Justice in case the EASA fails to take a decision). 
 182. See Cefic: European Chemical Industry Council, A Strengthened Role for 
the European Chemicals Agency (Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.cefic.be/files/ 
publications/11.doc (arguing that the European Chemicals Agency, just like 
EASA, needs the power to issue legally binding decisions). 
 183. See Case T-30/04, João Andrade Sena v. European Aviation Safety 
Agency, 2005 O.J. (C 171) 35 (dismissing the challenge to EASA’s rejection of 
plaintiff’s candidacy for the post of Executive Director). 
 184. See Case C-396/06, Eivind F. Kramme v. SAS Scandinavian Airlines 
Danmark A/S, 2006 O.J. (C 294) 52. 
 185. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. 
 186. See Parliament & Council Regulation 261/2004, art. 5, 2004 O.J. (L 46) 1 
(establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the 
event of denied boarding). The Regulation also limited compensation if the 
cancellation was “caused by extraordinary circumstances which could not have 
been avoided even if all reasonable measures have been taken.”  Id. art. 5(3). 
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developed by the EASA on continuing airworthiness and 
maintenance organization approvals.187 For actors other than the 
company applying for the airworthiness certificate, the European 
Court of Justice is much harder to access. This is especially true with 
regard to the consumers who are affected by EASA decisions every 
time they take a plane. In such a case the before-mentioned rules of 
the EASA Basic Regulation do not provide access to the board of 
appeals, and the subsequent link to the European Court of Justice 
does not work either. Similarly there are no provisions for other than 
the applying aircraft company to challenge the legality of an 
environmental certificate. Further, the European Treaties do not 
provide for judicial review either because Art. 230 Section (4) 
TEC188 as interpreted by the ECJ does not apply.189
B. MULTIPLE-PRINCIPAL-SYSTEM 
Beyond the judicial controls there is a broad set of political and 
financial accountability mechanisms. One of the most notable 
features is the structural relationship between agents and principals. 
Whereas in the United States administrative agencies on the federal 
level are accountable to President and Congress as their two major 
principals, in Europe there are at least four political principals. In this 
multiple-principal-system there is no identifiable hegemon.190 E.U. 
 187. See Case C-396/06, Kramme, 2006 O.J. (C 294) 52 at ¶ 16 (noting that 
although EASA’s airworthiness requirements are not directly at issue, they are 
nevertheless relevant); Commission Regulation 2042/2003, pmbl., Annex, 2003 
O.J. (L 315) 1, 4 (establishing common technical requirements for ensuring the 
continuing airworthiness of aircraft). 
 188. See Consolidated Treaty, supra note 146, art. 230 (allowing that “[a]ny 
natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings 
against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in 
the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and 
individual concern to the former”). 
 189. See Albertina Albors-Llorens, The Standing of Private Parties to Challenge 
Community Measures: Has the European Court Missed the Boat, 62 CAMBRIDGE 
L.J. 72, 72 (2003) (providing an overview on the standing requirements of the ECJ 
and noting that in the past forty years “private parties have rarely been able to 
surmount this formidable admissibility barrier when challenging Community 
acts”). 
 190. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 
2413-31 (1991) (pointing out that the lacking hegemony of a single EU actor is of 
course not accidental but the perpetuation of basic features of European 
integration: balance and compromise, larger and smaller states acting on a level of 
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agencies are horizontally held accountable to the Council, the 
Commission, the European Parliament, and the Member States, with 
additional accountability to the Court of Auditors and the European 
Ombudsman. Structurally, the political accountability191 of the E.U. 
administration differs in a significant point from the hierarchical 
political accountability that is still prevalent in most Member State 
administrations.192 Other than on the national level, there is no 
responsible Minister to be held politically accountable.193
Of particular interest is the increasing role of the European 
Parliament, which plays an ever more active part in crafting and 
controlling the agencies. A first serious instrument to shape the E.U. 
agencies accountability profile is the increasing lawmaking power of 
the European Parliament, which still does not include initiative 
powers, but guarantees relevant participation and veto rights in the 
process of setting up the agency. As one leading European law 
scholar puts it: “The greater the specification of agency objectives 
and criteria for attainment, the greater the control exercised over 
relative equality). 
 191. See RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITY 
IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 36-74 (2003) (opining that the capacity of governments 
to severely infringe citizens’ rights justifies correspondingly strict guarantees of 
government accountability); see also Jody Freeman, Extending Public 
Accountability Through Privatization: From Public Law to Publicization, in 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES, supra note 
123, at 83, 84 (arguing that political accountability is reaching into the private 
sphere as the price private actors pay for “access to lucrative opportunities to 
deliver goods and services”). 
 192. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE 
SOCIOLOGY 987-89 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Univ. of California 
Press 1978) (1968) (positing that bureaucratized administrations are indestructible 
and virtually impervious to revolution); A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 195, 308-35 (5th ed. Gaunt, Inc. 2004) 
(1897) (noting that droit administratif is the prevalent system in most continental 
countries and contrasting it with the English administrative system). But see 
Bovens, supra note 108, at 110 (observing that many countries are starting to move 
away from such hierarchical accountability systems by establishing independent 
offices of ombudsman, auditors, and inspectors). 
 193. See Veit Mehde, Die Ministerverantwortlichkeit nach dem Grundgesetz, 
116 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 13 (2001) (comparing Britain, France, 
Germany and Italy); Bovens, supra note 108, at 109 (noting that “it is still being 
debated whether individual European commissioners are accountable for civil 
servants working in the commission”). Instead, there is only “a collective 
accountability of the commission as a whole to the European Parliament.” Id. 
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agency choices by the legislature.”194 Moreover the Parliament put 
significant legislative efforts into expanding the transparency 
requirements for financial management. Particularly important is the 
2002 Financial Regulation, which extended the transparency 
requirements in budgetary procedures and financial management,195 
and also provided the European Parliament with the power to give 
discharge to the agencies for the implementation of their annual 
budgets.196 Furthermore, the Parliament shares with the Council the 
budgetary power—and the “power of the purse” is indeed one of the 
most effective ex ante accountability tools.197 With regard to ex post 
accountability, there are no general rules that would allow either the 
European Parliament or the National Parliaments to scrutinize an 
agency’s activities. However, the Parliament has the right to summon 
the head of some of the more recently founded agencies, such as the 
EASA.198 In addition, the European Parliament uses more informal 
instruments, such as inter-institutional agreements, in order to 
supplement accountability arrangements for agencies.199
 194. See CRAIG, supra note 3, at 169 (pointing out, conversely, that vague 
injunctions as to what the agency is intended to do will leave more power to the 
agency). 
 195. For an overview on Council Regulation 1605/2002; see Vos, Agencies and 
the European Union, supra note 55, at 138; Craig, supra note 102, at 108-10 and 
passim. 
 196. See Council Regulation 1605/2002, art. 185 no. 2 (ruling that discharge for 
the implementation of the budgets of bodies set up by the Communities and having 
legal personality, which actually receive grants charged to the budget, shall be 
given by the European Parliament on the recommendation of the Council). 
 197. The procedure for adoption of the budget is laid down in Art. 272 TEC; 
Ellen Vos, European Administrative Reform and Agencies 13 (Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 2000/51 2000), 
available at http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/00_51.pdf (pointing out that the 
Parliament has significant power due to its ability to determine Community 
subsidies and agencies’ budgets). 
 198. See Parliament & Council Regulation 216/2008, supra note 66, art. 38(2) 
(empowering the Parliament to invite EASA’s Executive Director “to report on the 
carrying out of his/her tasks”). 
 199. See, e.g., Interinstitutional Agreement Between the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission on Budgetary Discipline and Sound Financial 
Management, 2006 O.J. (C 139) 1 (EC); Curtin, supra note 25, at 532 (arguing that 
the European Parliament has used its role as co-legislator of the Financial 
Regulation to expand transparency in budgetary procedures); see also Catherine 
Moury, Explaining the European Parliament’s Right to Appoint and Invest the 
Commission, 20 W. EUR. POL. 367, 370 (2007) (arguing that Parliament has been 
trying to increase its power by using its advantageous bargaining position in 
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The arrows mark the accountability relations of the EU agencies to 
their various principals, including the Council of the European Union, 
the Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of 
Justice, the Court of Auditors, and the EU Member States. 
The European Ombudsman also counts into the forums established to 
enhance political accountability, although this institution is largely 
lacking formal powers to coerce public actors into compliance.200  
Yet the European Ombudsman office deals with accountability of 
E.U. agencies too. The annual report of 2005 revealed that the 
European Ombudsman office subjected EASA to inquiries in one 
case, and subjected EMEA to inquiries in three cases.201 In 2006, the 
 
appointing members of the Commission). 
 200. See Bovens, supra note 108, at 116 (asserting that most administrative 
accountability relations, such as ombudsman, are effective only if parliaments pay 
attention to them). 
 201. See THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL REPORT 2005 160 (2006), 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/report05/pdf/en/rap05_en.pdf (revealing that in 
2005 the European Ombudsman dealt with 627 inquiries). 
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Ombudsman helped to find a friendly solution for an EASA 
employee who was rejected after serving six months in a 
probationary period.202 Moreover, the Ombudsman engages in 
standard setting for accountability structures and processes.203 For 
example, in 2000 the Ombudsman issued the “European Code of 
Good Administrative Behaviour” and urged the European Union 
institutions to sign up.204 Indeed, in 2001 the EMEA became one of 
the (few) E.U. agencies to apply the Code.205
The accountability relation of each agency to the European Court 
of Auditors includes a broad range of financial requirements.  The 
Court of Auditors publishes detailed reports on the annual agency 
accounts, along with a statement of the agency in the Official Journal 
of the European Union.206 For example, the Court of Auditor’s report 
 202. See THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL REPORT 2006 74 (2007), 
http://ombudsman.europa.eu/report06/pdf/en/rap06_en.pdf (holding the EASA 
provided incomplete information with regard to the complainant’s installation 
allowances and that, although case law provides that officials are presumed to 
know their rights, Community institutions still may not provide misleading 
information). 
 203. See Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, Promoting Accountability in Multi-
level Governance: A Network Approach 23 (European Governance Papers, No. C-
06-02, 2006), available at http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-
connex-C-06-02.pdf (describing the European Ombudsman as performing “fire-
watching” and “fire-fighting” functions, as illustrated by the Ombudsman’s use of 
his European Code of Good Administrative Behavior as the benchmark for 
maladministration in individual cases). 
 204. See generally THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN, THE EUROPEAN CODE OF 
GOOD ADMINISTRATION BEHAVIOUR 6-9 (2005), http://ombudsman.europa.eu/ 
code/pdf/en/code2005_en.pdf (emphasizing citizens’ rights to good administration 
and noting that the Ombudsman uses the Code in its investigations of alleged 
maladministration cases). 
 205. See Commission Regulation 216/2008, supra note 66, art. 58(1) (subjecting 
the agency to the fundamentally important Council regulation 1049/2001 that 
authorizes public access to the EU institutions’ documents).  The Regulation also 
allows individuals to file a complaint with the European Ombudsman office if 
EASA does not timely reply to a request for information.  Id. pmbl., ¶ 36.  
Additionally, the Regulation entitles any natural or legal person to write to the 
EASA and to receive an answer in her or his own language. Id. art. 58(3). 
 206. See, e.g., Court of Auditors Report on the Annual Accounts of the European 
Aviation Safety Agency for the Financial Year 2005 Together with the Agency’s 
Replies, ¶¶ 1-10, 2006 O.J. (C 312) 6 (finding EASA’s accounts reliable and listing 
problematic issues); see also Court of Auditors Report on the Annual Accounts of 
the European Medicines Agency for the Financial Year 2005 Together with the 
Agency’s Replies, ¶ 5, 2006 O.J. (C 312) 12 [hereinafter Annual Accounts of the 
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on the European Medicines Agency for 2005 included the final 
budget (111.8 million Euro), the total staff (371.5).207 In the area of 
Medicinal Products for Human Use, the ECA reported the 
applications for marketing authorizations for (forty-three, with 
twenty-four receiving favorable opinions), the average evaluation 
time (203 days), the opinions after authorization (1148), acts of 
pharmacovigilance (91,565 reports), scientific opinions (135) and 
procedures for mutual recognition (8451).208 Similarly, accounts 
were given for the agency’s activities toward Medicinal Products for 
Veterinary Use and Orphan Medicinal Products.209 Generally the 
concession of some financial flexibility is acknowledged as a crucial 
precondition for the concept of regulatory agencies. For example, the 
EASA Basic Regulation states: “In order to guarantee the full 
autonomy and independence of the Agency, it should be granted an 
autonomous budget whose revenue comes essentially from a 
contribution from the Community and from fees paid by the users of 
the system.”210 Yet in reaction to the Commission’s credibility and 
corruption crisis of the mid-1990s, financial accountability became a 
major concern for many E.U. actors. The E.U. adopted several 
overall financial regulatory regimes, and the system of financial 
accountability has been unified for all E.U. agencies in 2002.211 The 
E.U. established a range of budgetary principles, including those of 
unity, budget accuracy, annuality, equilibrium, universality, 
specification, sound financial management, and transparency.212 
Financial control is exercised ex ante to set up and decide the annual 
European Medicines Agency] (indicating EMEA passed the audit). 
 207. Annual Accounts of the European Medicines Agency, supra note 206, at 
tbls. 1-2. 
 208. Id. tbl. 1. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Parliament & Council Regulation 216/2008, supra note 66, pmbl., ¶ 27. 
 211. See Council Regulation 1605/2002, supra note 196, arts. 1-5 (requiring all 
revenues and expenditures to be entered into the budget); see also Commission 
Regulation 2342/2002, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 357) 1, 7 (laying down detailed rules 
for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002); 
Commission Regulation 478/2007, pmbl., 2007 O.J. (L 111) 13 (amending 
Regulation 2342/2002). 
 212. Council Regulation 1605/2002, supra note 197, art. 3; see Matthew 
Flinders, Distributed Public Governance in the European Union, 11 J. EUR. PUB. 
POL’Y 520, 536 (2004) (asserting that because agencies fall under the so-called 
non-compulsory part of the European Community budget, the European Parliament 
can impose strict accountability requirements). 
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budget.213 In a gradual process, the agency provides a proposal for 
next year’s budget that serves as basis for an overall draft of the 
Commission.214 The overall E.U. budget is set up by the European 
Council and the European Parliament as budget authority.215 The ex 
post control mechanisms are supported by the agencies through the 
submission of detailed annual accounts, including financial 
statements such as the balance sheet, economic outturn account, cash 
flow statement, and relevant annexes, which supplement the 
information contained in the financial statements and the report of 
the implementation of the budget.216 The European Parliament is also 
entitled with financial control competencies, which are of a rather 
political nature. Art. 49 (4) of the EASA Basic Regulation rules that 
the European Parliament, acting on a recommendation from the 
Council, shall give a discharge to the Executive Director of the 
Agency in respect of the budget. Moreover, both EMEA and EASA 
are also subject to the jurisdiction of the European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF), which is an independent authority within the Commission, 
charged to fight internal and external corruption.217
C. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
As described in the preceding paragraphs, the European agencies 
are accountable to a multitude of principals. The identified 
responsibility and control relations could also be understood in terms 
of internal and external accountability mechanisms.218 In this 
 213. See Ellen Vos, Reforming the European Commission: What Role to Play 
for EU Agencies?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1113, 1126-27 (2000) (pointing out 
that Parliament has not hesitated to exercise its ex ante control of agencies budgets 
“in the name of transparency and accountability”). 
 214. Consolidated Treaty, supra note 146, art. 272. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See, e.g., EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY, ANNUAL ACCOUNTS FINANCIAL 
YEAR 2006 3 (2007), www.emea.europa.eu/pdfs/general/direct/emeaar/EMEA_ 
Annual_Report_2006_full.pdf (asserting that for a public entity such as EMEA, the 
purpose of the financial report is to provide information useful for decision-making 
and to demonstrate the agency’s responsible handling of resources entrusted to it). 
 217. See, e.g., Parliament & Council Regulation 216/2008, supra note 66, art. 61 
(maintaining that the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) apply to 
EASA without restriction); Parliament & Council Regulation 726/2004, supra note 
95, art. 69 (requiring unconditional submission to OLAF’s authority). 
 218. Cf. Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual 
  
2009] SUPRANATIONAL ADMINISTRATION 475 
 
perspective, the Member States are the primary external principal. 
All the other entities are located within the E.U. institutions, and thus 
are internal principals. The role of the Member States is probably the 
most remarkable and genuinely supranational feature in the E.U. 
agency accountability regime. They exercise controls not only 
through their representatives in the E.U. institutions and committees, 
but also in a quasi horizontal accountability mode through political 
mechanisms on the national level, such as public hearings held by the 
national parliaments to scrutinize the work of European Agencies.219
1. Management Board and Committees 
A particularly powerful accountability tool in the hands of the 
Member States is the management board of either agency. The 
institutional designs of both the EMEA and EASA guarantee one 
seat to a nominee of each Member State.220 The same mechanism of 
one nominee per Member State is applied to the composition of the 
EMEA Committees for Medicinal Products for Human Use and 
Medicinal Product for Veterinary Use.221 The extent to which 
Member State representatives actually act as agents of their nations, 
rather than as agents of the European Community, is not always 
clear. The status of the individual members in terms of independence 
or constraints issued by the Member State is not uniform. Whereas 
the basic regulations of agencies such as the EMEA provide for 
certain independence,222 similar provisions are lacking in the EASA 
Recognition Regimes: Governance Without Global Government, 68 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 299-301 (2005) (positing that in an economically 
integrated world, in which regulatory decisions of national authorities can affect 
foreign entities, internal accountability refers to accountability of national 
authorities to their constituents, whereas external accountability refers to 
accountability of national authorities to outsiders). 
 219. See HOUSE OF COMMONS TRANSPORT COMMITTEE, THE WORK OF THE 
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY, 2005-06, H.C. 809, at 13-20, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmtran/809/809.pdf 
(assessing the working relationship between the U.K.’s Civil Aviation Authority 
and EASA). 
 220. Parliament & Council Regulation 726/2004, supra note 95, art. 65; 
Parliament & Council Regulation 216/2008, supra note 66, art. 34. 
 221. Parliament & Council Regulation 726/2004, supra note 95, art. 61(1). 
 222. See id. art. 61(6) (stating  that “Member States shall refrain from giving 
committee members and experts any instruction which is incompatible with their 
own individual tasks or with the tasks and responsibility of the Agency”).  The 
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basic regulation. Thus in the case of EASA, the Member State 
representatives appear to be subject to directives of either national 
government. Hence the crucial level of reference for the management 
board representatives is either national state.223 All Member States 
are represented on the management boards of both the EMEA and 
EASA. The partially obstructing effects of this design caused the 
Commission to press for a general reform of the management boards. 
The Commission championed a more professional and scientific 
model favoring professional experts instead of nation state 
representatives.224 Yet these ideas were dismissed in the 2004 EMEA 
reform process.225
2. Network Accountability 
Another informal mode of horizontal accountability results from 
the day-to-day information exchange between the European agency 
and the relevant authorities on the national scale (“hub and spoke 
model”).226 For example, the EASA regulation includes a provision 
for an information network between the agency, the commission, and 
national aviation authorities.227 The EASA can enlist the help of 
Regulation also sets out a mandatory deference standard which purports that 
“members of the committees and experts responsible for evaluating medicinal 
products shall rely on the scientific evaluation and resources.” Id. 
 223. See RIEDEL, supra note 126, at 70. 
 224. See Communication from the Commission, The Operating Framework for 
the European Regulatory Agencies, supra note 82, at 9 (criticizing the status quo 
and arguing for smaller boards with at least some members nominated by 
interested parties and some national executives with experience in managing 
agencies); see also Draft Interinstitutional Agreement, supra note 89, art. 11(5) 
(arguing that Member States should be allowed to appoint their representatives to 
the boards of only those agencies that exercise executive powers in those States). 
 225. See Parliament & Council Regulation 726/2004, supra note 95, art. 1 
(laying down Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of 
medicines for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines 
Agency). 
 226. See Hofmann & Türk, supra note 23, at 87 (noting that European agencies 
integrate national administrative bodies and authorities into their operation, usually 
through the creation of networks to facilitate cooperation and exchange of 
expertise). 
 227. See Parliament & Council Regulation 216/2008, supra note 66, art. 15(1) 
(stating that “[t]he Commission, the Agency, and the national aviation authorities 
shall exchange any information available to them in the context of the application 
of [the EASA Basic] Regulation and its implementing rules”). 
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national aviation authorities in the issuing of airworthiness 
certificates, drawing on their expertise in this area, and can work 
with such national authorities for investigation and enforcement.228 
In the case of EASA, the necessity of networking with the national 
agencies is evident: The transnational character of the regulatory 
object requires the flow of information between relevant players at 
national, Community, and international levels. In addition, practical 
needs of inspection and enforcement argue for cooperation. The 
European pharmaceutical regulation relies also on a network of 
national and European authorities. The EMEA provides for the 
network’s technological framework through the management of 
EUDRANET, a human and veterinary pharmaceuticals 
telecommunication network.229 EUDRANET is intended to provide a 
platform for communication, information exchange, and cooperation 
for authorities, policy makers, scientific experts, and representatives 
of pharmaceutical businesses.230
3. The Practice of Horizontal Accountability 
The United Kingdom provided a most recent and fascinating 
practical example of horizontal accountability mode involving the 
European Aviation Safety Agency, when the Transport Committee231 
of the British Parliament explored the organization and work practice 
of the EASA.232 The Parliamentary Committee summoned the head 
 228. See id. arts. 10, 20, 52(1)(a) (providing for the development of certification 
specifications employing the expertise of national aviation authorities, for national 
authorities to conduct investigations of the undertakings in application of specific 
Articles of the regulation, and for Member States, the Commission, and the EASA 
to cooperate to ensure compliance and enforcement). 
 229. See IDABC, Eudranet: European Telecommunication Network in 
Pharmaceuticals, http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/2291 (last visited Oct. 12, 
2008) (explaining the management, objectives, and functioning of EUDRANET). 
 230. Id. 
 231. See generally HOUSE OF COMMONS, STANDING ORDERS OF THE HOUSE OF 
COMMONS – PUBLIC BUSINESS 2007, at 150-53 (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www. 
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmstords/105/105.pdf (setting forth that 
the Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the 
expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Transport and its 
associated public bodies). The Committee is one of the departmental select 
committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing 
Orders, principally in Standing Order No. 152. Id. 
 232. See HOUSE OF COMMONS TRANSPORT COMMITTEE, THE WORK OF THE 
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of the national British Civil Aviation Authority—widely 
acknowledged as a worldwide model authority in its field233— 
representatives of pilots and aircraft engineers organizations, and 
several experts from the social sciences. The Parliamentary 
Committee was not satisfied with the performance of the EASA, 
decrying the fact that the speed of rule-making had slowed down 
since it was transferred from the national British to the European 
level.234 In the highly technical and evolutionary field of aircraft 
safety, this caused worries about keeping pace with the necessary 
standards.235 Other concerns were related to a lack of responsibility 
among the EASA staff, the personal choices of the management 
board, as well as the deficiencies in the personal and technical 
resources that EASA needed to manage its current tasks.236
As a conclusion of its assessment, the British Parliamentary 
Committee stated in drastic words: 
It is with dismay that we have learnt of the chaotic state of 
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which at this 
time is not able to fulfill its declared purpose. EASA is an 
accident waiting to happen—if its problems are left 
unchecked, we believe it has the potential to put aviation 
safety in the UK and the rest of Europe at risk at some point 
in the future.237
The Committee also warned against transferring further powers 
from the national level to the E.U. agency, stating that “[t]he United 
Kingdom cannot and must not transfer any further powers from the 
CAA to EASA until the Government is assured that the serious 
problems of governance, management and resources at EASA have 
been resolved,” expecting assurances from the Minister on the 
topic.238 The Parliamentary Committee urged the British government 
to work towards resolving the operational problems of EASA. Faced 
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY, supra note 219, at 13-22 (examining the background 
of the EASA, its current effectiveness, and the operational problems with which it 
is faced). 
 233. See id. at 23-25 (detailing CAA’s good performance review marks). 
 234. Id. at 17. 
 235. See id. (noting that the delays in regulation threaten aviation safety). 
 236. Id.  at 15. 
 237. Id.  at 16. 
 238. Id. 
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with these charges, the British government took various actions. 
About six months later, the British government claimed to have 
“played a leading role in improving the performance of the EASA” 
and announced that it would “continue to take steps to ensure that the 
Agency is firmly established as a properly resourced and high 
performing safety regulator.”239 The United Kingdom pointed 
especially to the influential work of their member on the EASA 
Management Board to improve manpower, planning, and risk 
management.240 In addition, the British government stressed the 
close informational and personal exchange of the E.U. agency and its 
national pendant.241 Along these lines, the French Parliament 
recently started its own extended inquiry into the entire European 
Agency system.242 Its report questioned the overall performance of 
the agency system, and in particular its legal framework.243 
Moreover, the French urged the European Commission to provide a 
thorough evaluation on the agency system. The agencies were urged 
to make information on their work available in the languages of all 
Member States.244
III. FUTURE PROSPECTS 
With regard to future prospects, there are several fascinating issues 
likely to appear on the agenda. In particular there is the 2007 
European Treaty of Lisbon, which provides for a significant 
 239. HOUSE OF COMMONS TRANSPORT COMMITTEE, THE WORK OF THE CIVIL 
AVIATION AUTHORITY: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE’S 
THIRTEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2005-06, 2006-07, H.C. 371, at 3 (expressing the 
British government’s responses to the Transport Committee report, and the 
government’s belief that the EASA is now on track to assume the additional 
responsibilities envisioned for it under upcoming amendments to Community 
legislation). 
 240. Id. at 5. 
 241. See id. (noting how the CAA’s Safety Regulation Group keeps its staff 
informed on EASA’s transitional phases by utilizing multiple communication 
formats, including management briefings that facilitate the structured diffusion of 
information throughout each part of the organization). 
 242. Rapport D’Information Déposé par la Délégation de l’Assemblée Nationale 
pour l’Union Européenne sur les Agences Européennes par M. Christian Philip, 
Député, COM (2005) 59 final, COM (2005) 190 final, COM (2005) 280 final (May 
3, 2006). 
 243. Id. 
 244. See id. at 85. 
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constitutionalization of E.U. agencies. Moreover, the Treaty shows 
an emerging trend toward global licensing cooperation between 
agencies of the E.U. and other jurisdictions. 
A. THE E.U. TREATY OF LISBON (2007) 
On December 13, 2007 the heads of the E.U. Member States 
agreed upon the Treaty of Lisbon245 in order to replace the collapsed 
project of a European Constitutional Treaty. The new reform treaty 
provides for a multitude of institutional, substantive and procedural 
amendments to the Treaties on the European Union and the European 
Community.246 Procedurally, the Treaty of Lisbon primarily modifies 
the decision-making processes of the European Union in order to 
cope with the new reality of twenty-seven E.U. Member States in a 
political entity which at the outset included only six.247 The Treaty of 
Lisbon for the first time provides for a constitutional framework of 
European administration, including rules for the delegation of rule-
making power from the Council to the Commission,248 and 
“administrative cooperation” among the Union and the Member 
States so as to “improve their administrative capacity to implement 
Union law.”249 It also provides indirectly for the constitutionalization 
 245. See generally Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 
306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. 
 246. See id. at 10 (stating that the Member States have agreed upon the 
“Amendments to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community”). 
 247. See Margot Wallstrom, Vice President of the European Comm’n, Speech to 
the National Forum on Europe (Feb. 28, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/ 
press_office/speeches-press_releases/wallstromforumspeech_en.htm (observing 
“[y]ou can’t run a Union of 27 with machinery designed for a Community of 
six.”). 
 248. See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 245, art. 2, ¶ 236 (resembling the Meroni 
doctrine in stating that the Council “may delegate to the Commission the power to 
adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain 
non-essential elements of the legislative act”). The Treaty further specifies that 
“[t]he objectives, content, scope and duration of the delegation of power shall be 
explicitly defined in the legislative acts.” Id. Furthermore, the Treaty emphasizes 
that ”[t]he essential elements of an area shall be reserved for the legislative act and 
accordingly shall not be the subject of a delegation of power.” Id. 
 249. Id. art. 2, ¶ 150 (suggesting the facilitation of the exchange of information 
and of civil servants, in addition to supporting training schemes, as potential 
actions to foster this improvement). 
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of E.U. agencies. Although the agencies are not included in the 
catalogue of the Union’s institutions,250 various new provisions 
regulate the agencies’ actions. The adoption of the proposed reforms 
would enhance and unify the accountability regimes of E.U. agencies 
significantly. Presumably the most important practical aspect is the 
explicit and universal inclusion of the actions of E.U. agencies under 
the jurisdiction of the European Courts. The proposed amendment 
states that the European Court of Justice “. . . shall . . . review the 
legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended 
to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.”251 Standing is to be 
granted to “[a]ny natural or legal person . . . against an act addressed 
to that person or which is of direct or individual concern to them, and 
against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does 
not entail implementing measures.”252 Once the Treaty of Lisbon 
comes into effect, it would also tremendously enhance the publicity 
of agency actions. It proposes not only that “[i]n order to promote 
good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the 
Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their 
work as openly as possible,” but also grants citizens of the Union a 
right of access to “documents of the Union institutions, bodies, 
offices, and agencies, whatever their medium.”253
The Treaty of Lisbon was originally supposed to enter into force 
on January 1, 2009—provided that all twenty-seven E.U. Member 
States would have ratified the document by that point. Contrary to 
the 2004 draft for a European Constitutional Treaty, which in most 
states had to overcome the barrier of a referendum, the framers of the 
Treaty of Lisbon assumed that the ratification would not require 
referendums, but only qualified majority approvals in the national 
legislatures. European officials justify this assumption by declaring 
that now there is not a Constitution but a mere reform treaty at stake. 
 250. See id. art. 1, ¶ 14 (enumerating the Union’s institutions, specifically 
stating that the  “Union’s institutions shall be: the European Parliament, the 
European Council, the Council, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, the European Central Bank, the Court of Auditors”). 
 251. Id. art. 2, ¶ 214(a) (amending Article 230(1) of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community). 
 252. Id. art. 2, ¶ 214(c). 
 253. Id. art. 2, ¶ 28(a), (b) (amending article 255 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, which presently grants E.U. citizens access only to 
documents of the European Parliament, Council, and Commission). 
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Thus, so the argument goes, the same parliamentary ratification 
procedure applies as it did in the context of earlier major reform 
treaties, such as the Single European Act of 1986, and the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992 establishing the Economic and Monetary Union.254 
All major countries followed the course of the Treaty in the first 
phase of ratification. Even the French, whose negative referendum in 
2005 stopped the Constitutional Treaty, have already approved the 
Treaty of Lisbon by a parliamentary majority in the French National 
Assembly.255 Similarly in Britain, where the political forces in favor 
of a referendum are very strong, the House of Commons has also 
already voted against a referendum and for the parliamentary 
ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon.256 The British judiciary upheld 
the Parliament centered course of the British government, and turned 
down a lawsuit which was brought in favor of a referendum.257
However, the new avenue to European institutional reform has not 
remained unchallenged. Opponents of the recent shift in the mode of 
constitutional change point to the broad convergences of the Treaty 
of Lisbon and the failed draft for a Constitutional Treaty.258 The 
 254. See generally Vaughne Miller, European Union (Amendment) Bill, Bill 48 
of 2007-08 (House of Commons Library, Research Paper 08/03, 2008), 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2008/rp08-003.pdf (discussing 
the treaty ratification process in the UK and the ratification procedures in other 
Member States). 
 255. See French Parliament Adopts Lisbon Treaty, AFP, Feb. 8, 2008, http:// 
www.france24.com/en/20080208-french-parliament-adopts-lisbon-treaty-france-eu 
(documenting the resounding approval of the Lisbon Treaty by the French National 
Assembly and Senate). 
 256. See MPs Reject EU Treaty Referendum, BBC NEWS, Mar. 5, 2008, 
http://newsvote.bbe.co.uk./mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics
/7277644.stm (describing how the House of Commons, by 311 votes to 248 votes, 
turned down the proposal to hold a UK-wide referendum concerning whether to 
ratify the Lisbon Treaty). 
 257. The Queen v. Office of the Prime Minister, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 1409, 
¶¶ 57-59 (finding the ratification process through a parliamentary vote lawful and 
referendum unnecessary). 
 258. See, e.g., La Bôite à Outils du Traité de Lisbonne, LE MONDE (France), 
Oct. 27, 2007, at 21 (publishing an open letter by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the 
former French President who had chaired the Convention that had framed the 
abandoned Treaty for a European Constitution, where Giscard claims that the 
Treaty of Lisbon is substantially equivalent to the original Treaty for a European 
Constitution (En Traité européen “les outils sont exactement les mêmes, seul 
l'ordre a été changé dans la boîte à outils . . . ‘les innovations permettant 
d'améliorer le fonctionnement de l'Europe sont conservées ’ dans le nouveau traité 
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majority vote in the Republic of Ireland, which so far has been the 
only Member State to proceed with a referendum, rejected the 
Treaty.259 With the Irish rejection, the ratification process came to a 
standstill. However, in light of the huge importance of the 
institutional reform, and in order to cope with the new reality of a 
political community including twenty-seven Member States, the 
Council and the Commission are making huge efforts to solve the 
crisis arising from the Irish rejection.260 Due to the broad coalition in 
favor of institutional reform, the Treaty of Lisbon is still quite likely 
to come into existence as proposed.261 After E.U. leaders agreed to a 
series of concessions, Ireland is expected to have a second 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty during the fall of 2009.262
B. GLOBAL LICENSING COOPERATION 
Another important development is the increase of global licensing 
cooperation. Forums and instruments are particularly well developed 
in the work of the EASA. In this subject matter, international 
cooperation makes perfect sense because airplane licensing and 
institutionnel”)).  This is probably  the strongest argument for the necessity of 
referendums on the Treaty of Lisbon instead of legislative ratifications. 
 259. See IR. CONST., 1937, arts. 46-47 (requiring that ratification of an 
amendment to the Constitution of Ireland be effected by referendum); see also 
Vaughne Miller, The Treaty of Lisbon: An Uncertain Future 10 (House of 
Commons Library, Research Paper 08/66, 2008), available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2008/rp08-066.pdf (noting that 
the reason for the referendum was that any “’significant’ amendment to EU 
Treaties requires an amendment to the Irish Constitution”). 
 260. See Press Release, European Parliament, Sarkozy to the European 
Parliament: “Europe Cannot be Condemned to Inaction” (July 9, 2008), http:// 
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-PRESS&refere 
nce=20080709IPR33856 (discussing the Irish “no-vote” and the current EU 
Presidency’s opinions regarding the importance of the Treaty of Lisbon for the 
continued enlargement of Europe). 
 261. See Miller, supra note 254, at 59-70 (reporting that twenty-four Member 
States have already ratified the treaty with the remaining two in the process of 
ratifying it). Cf. Europa – Treaty of Lisbon, Taking Europe into the 21st Century, 
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2008) (updating 
the status of approval of the Treaty of Lisbon, with Spain’s and Italy’s  
endorsements of the Treaty in July 2008). 
 262. See BBC Ireland PM confirms EU vote plan, BBC NEWS, Dec. 12, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7779854.stm (reporting that Ireland’s Prime 
Minister Brian Cowen said that on the basis of concessions agreed at to an E.U. 
summit in Brussels, he was prepared to go back to the Irish people next year). 
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certification is per se a regulatory subject of global dimensions, 
equally relevant for each authority in the jurisdiction that the specific 
airplane is intended to be employed. The EASA distinguished in its 
2008 work program three pillars of its activities in “[n]etworking and 
broadening partnership with civil aviation authorities across the 
world”.263 These are (1) the “reciprocal acceptance of certification 
findings with fit and able regulatory partners,” (2) the “building-up 
of the capabilities of less developed future regulatory partners,” and 
(3) “involvement in multilateral activities related to civil aviation 
safety and environmental compatibility regulation.”264 In particular 
the EASA and the American Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
are already cooperating on several levels. EASA and the FAA 
established a “mutual concept of ‘validation’ . . . the recognition and 
acceptance of each other’s type certificates without having to go 
through the entire certification process.”265 The EASA Executive 
Director illustrates this process by the example that while the EASA 
“is the primary certification authority for the new Airbus A380, the 
FAA will ‘validate’ the EASA type-certificate for the U.S., and vice 
versa for the Boeing 787 in Europe.”266 Article 9 of the EASA-Basic 
regulation provides a normative basis for the acceptance of a third-
country approval.267 The EASA and its American counterpart are 
constantly exchanging guidance material and holding common 
 263. EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY, 2008 WORK PROGRAMME 26 
(2007) (maintaining that its activities in this domain are crucial activities of the 
EASA). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Philip Butterworth-Hayes, With Patrick Goudou, AEROSPACE AMERICA, 
June 2006, at 10 (interviewing EASA Executive Director Patrick Goudou 
regarding topics ranging from the interface between EASA and national safety 
agencies to how EASA will work with the FAA on joint certification). 
 266. Id. 
 267. See, e.g., Parliament & Council Regulation 216/2008, supra note 66, art. 9 
(allowing non-E.U. airlines to operate within the E.U. as long as they comply with 
standards promulgated by the International Civil Aviation Organization); see also 
Executive Director of the European Aviation Safety Agency Decision No. 
001/2007/C, Mar. 9, 2007, art. 1 (providing a recent application of this principle, 
whereby the Decision amends Article 3 of Decision No. 2004/04/CF of 10 
December 2004 on the acceptance of certification findings made by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) for products designed in the United States by 
replacing the words “minor repair design of a product for which the United States 
of America is State of design” with the words “repair design, not related to a 
critical part, of a product”). 
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workshops.268 Several times, the EASA and the FAA published their 
positive approval in common press conferences.269 One could 
identify a similar pattern of transatlantic cooperation for the 
European Medicines Agency, which also seeks close cooperation 
with its American counterpart, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).270 In terms of administrative accountability, 
the fascinating emergence of global licensing cooperation among 
agencies on different continents is far from unproblematic. The 
puzzling question is how an adequate level of accountability could be 
ensured in cases where a particular rule or decision is only formally 
issued by a European agency, but pre-determined or at least heavily 
influenced by a foreign authority. So far, there has been no major 
academic discussion on this issue of global administrative law; 
however, the identification of the problem will hopefully spur further 
scholarly inquiries.271
 268. See, e.g., EU/US International Aviation Safety Conference 2007, 
http://www.easa.europa.eu/conf2007/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2008) (reporting on this 
annual conference’s success as a major forum on aviation safety and noting that 
EASA and FAA are co-chairing it, as usual). See generally Motion for a 
Resolution to Wind up the Debate on the Statement by the Commission Pursuant 
to Rule 103(2) of the Rules of Procedure, EUR. PARL. DOC. B6-0007 4 (2007) 
(acknowledging the cooperation of EASA and FAA in the area of safety). 
 269. See, e.g., Press Release, Press and Public Diplomacy Delegation of the 
European Union, News Release No. 107/06: European Union Satisfied with EASA 
Safety Approval of Airbus A380 (Mar. 18, 2008), http://www.eurunion.org/eu/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=66&Itemid=58 (stating that, 
parallel to the EASA’s type-certification, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) had issued its “validation” of the A380 certification for the U.S. market). 
 270. See European Medicines Agency, Transatlantic Cooperation in 
Pharmaceutical Regulation: Identifying Opportunities for Administrative 
Simplification, http://www.ec.europa.eu/enterprise/pharmaceuticals/pharmacos/ 
docs/doc2007/2007_11/tasw_joint_announcement.pdf (describing the outcomes of 
the Transatlantic Administrative Simplification Workshop in relation to identifying 
opportunities for administrative simplification through transatlantic cooperation); 
WORK PROGRAMME FOR THE EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY 2005, 28 (2004) 
http://www.emea.europa.eu/pdfs/general/direct/emeawp/13835104en.pdf 
(designating as a key initiative that “[i]nteraction with the US Food and Drug 
Administration will be further developed through enhanced cooperation in the 
context of the confidentiality arrangements, e.g. in the fields  of orphan medicinal 
products, scientific advice requests, new applications, pharmacovigilance, 
development of guidelines and the exchange  of trainees and experts”). 
 271. See generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Symposium: Globalization, 
Accountability, and the Future of Administrative Law, 8 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 341 (2001) (describing the symposium articles’ coverage of the issues of 
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Beyond the two novel trends of constitutionalization and global 
licensing cooperation, it is also likely that the E.U. will keep 
expanding the agency system both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
There are already new agencies under preparation, such as the 
European Institute for Gender Equality272 and the European 
Electronic Communications Market Authority.273 A further 
empowerment of agencies would surely require stronger and more 
coherent procedural constraints, particularly towards consultation 
and participation rights.274 In this regard it will be helpful for the 
E.U. legislators to learn from the American experiences.275 Some 
authors are already proposing a legislative framework for European
administrative accountability and democratic deficits stemming from the rise of 
globalization); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: 
Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006) (discussing some of 
the accountability problems  arising in the context of global administrative law). 
Cf. Robert O. Keohane, The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the 
Use of Force, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1121 (2003) (developing a pluralistic theory of 
accountability, expounding eight accountability mechanisms found in democratic 
societies, and addressing the current practices of the Security Council from the 
perspective of accountability). 
 272. See Parliament & Council Regulation 1922/2006, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (L 403) 
9, 9 (EC) (establishing the European Institute for Gender Equality and setting forth 
the Institute’s objectives and associated tasks). 
 273. See Commission Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council Establishing the European Electronic Communications Market 
Authority, at 22, COM (2007) 699 final (Nov. 13, 2007) (proposing to establish the 
European Electronic Communications Market Authority and delineating its 
functions and role in the application of the regulatory framework). 
 274. See Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global 
Administrative Law?, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 63, 103-04 (2005) (examining 
the potential for U.S. administrative law to serve as a model in the development of 
a global administrative law, including mechanisms for increased participation). 
 275. See generally Damien Geradin, The Development of European Regulatory 
Agencies: Lessons from the American Experience, in REGULATION THROUGH 
AGENCIES IN THE EU, supra note 64, at 215 (examining the important development 
in the E.U.’s administrative structure associated with the considerable expansion of 
E.U. agencies and the related legal issues through systematic comparison with the 
U.S. regulatory system); Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The 
European Union, the United States, and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99 (2007) (exploring the practice of administrative reason-
giving in the European Union and the United States; and its important function in 
contributing to authentic democratic governance). 
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Union agencies similar to the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act of 
1946.276
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The system of European administration is undergoing a profound 
transformation. Most remarkably, since 1990 the European Union 
has established more than twenty-five administrative agencies to 
confront the challenges of the E.U. eastern enlargement, of increased 
responsibilities, and of economic globalization. The E.U. agencies do 
not operate as autonomous entities on the supranational scale, but 
rather are embedded into administrative networks of European and 
national authorities. Due to the lack of unifying provisions in the 
European Treaty framework, the accountability regimes are 
remarkably diverse. However, the case studies of this Article reveal 
not only a broad diversification of judicial review, participation, and 
transparency, but also a close connection between the formal powers 
of each agency and the applicable accountability mechanisms. The 
EASA, one of the first agencies vested with formal licensing powers, 
is identified as the agency with the most enhanced accountability 
features. One of the most idiosyncratic features of the E.U. agency 
system is the structural relationship between agents and principals. 
Whereas in the United States the President and Congress constitute 
the two major principals of federal agencies, the multiple-principal-
system of European governance is at least fourfold. E.U. agencies are 
held accountable to the Council, the Commission and the European 
Parliament and to the Member States. The latter accountability 
relation hints at the most genuinely supranational feature in the 
accountability regimes for E.U. agencies, which is a specific 
horizontal accountability mode applied by the Member States. In the 
system of European administration, the federal entities operate 
completely differently than in the institutional setting of U.S. 
 276. See, e.g., Damien Geradin, The Development of European Regulatory 
Agencies: What the EU Should Learn from American Experience, 11 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 1, 2 (2004-2005) (arguing that “the EU would benefit from the adoption of 
a European version of the APA”). See also Peter L. Strauss, Rulemaking in the 
Ages of Globalization and Information: What America Can Learn from Europe, 
and Vice Versa, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 645 (2006) (comparing how the European 
Commission shapes statutes and regulations with American approaches to 
administrative rulemaking). 
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federalism. The Member States govern over a broad set of control 
mechanisms, including the work of their representatives in the E.U. 
agencies’ management boards and expert committees, the day-to-day 
practice of European network administration, and political actions on 
the national level. With regard to future prospects, the article 
identified several fascinating issues. The new European Treaty of 
Lisbon of December 2007 provides for the constitutionalization of 
the E.U. agency regime. The reform treaty grants access to agency 
documents and judicial review against agency action. To that extent, 
it represents a remarkable unification of the currently very diverse 
accountability regimes for E.U. agencies. Moreover, with the 
emergence of global licensing cooperation between European 
agencies and global counterparts such as the U.S. Federal Aviation 
Administration and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, there are 
novel and important accountability issues on the horizon. 
 
 
